This report presents the findings of the project 'Improved Shock Absorbing Liner for Helmets'. A special tool was developed to produce flat samples of foam made of either the new design or the current design. A total of 161 flat foam samples were manufactured and tested to the Australian Standard for motorcycle and bicycle helmets. This included 100 samples with new design and 61 samples with current design. The newly designed shock absorbing foam liner, when compared with the current liner, displayed significantly more crushing, greater timeduration (interaction), less slab-cracking and recorded peak decelerations less than the required 300 g's (g-force).
Monday, December 29, 2008
Monday, December 22, 2008
Benchmarking general aviation fatal Car accidents in Australia
General aviation broadly comprises all civil aviation activity other than scheduled airline operations and is a major component of total aviation activity in Australia. This monograph provides an analysis of fatal accident trends in Australia and compares these with similar trends for the USA and Canada.
Benchmarking measures
The analysis focuses on fatal accidents and fatalities rather than all accidents as benchmarking measures. This is because the definition of general aviation accidents and the frequency of reporting varies substantially from country to country. In order to benchmark Australia’s general aviation safety record it is necessary to find a common definition of accidents across countries.
Currently fatal accidents are the only type of accidents that have a common definition and are equally reported in Australia, the US and Canada. Reported fatal accidents and fatalities are therefore used as a measure of overall general aviation safety.
Main points
Benchmarking measures
The analysis focuses on fatal accidents and fatalities rather than all accidents as benchmarking measures. This is because the definition of general aviation accidents and the frequency of reporting varies substantially from country to country. In order to benchmark Australia’s general aviation safety record it is necessary to find a common definition of accidents across countries.
Currently fatal accidents are the only type of accidents that have a common definition and are equally reported in Australia, the US and Canada. Reported fatal accidents and fatalities are therefore used as a measure of overall general aviation safety.
Main points
- Australia’s general aviation fatal accident rate has declined from 1.41 fatal accidents per 100 000 flight hours in 1990 to 1.00 fatal accidents per 100 000 flight hours in 2000
- Australia’s general aviation fatal accident rate per 100 000 flight hours for the year 2000 was the lowest of the three countries reported.
- Australia’s general aviation fatal accident rate per 100 000 flight hours has been below the Canadian and US rate for all years except for 1994 and 1998.
- Australia’s general aviation fatality rate per 100 000 flight hours has been below the Canadian and US rate for all years except for 1990 and 1999.
- In recent years the Canadian and US rates have improved and are closer to Australia’s rates.
Tuesday, December 16, 2008
Heavy Vehicle exposure limits and guidelines
The guidelines for health effects of whole-body vibration are well documented in Australian and International Standards. However, there is still much to be learnt about vibration dose/response relationships. In terms of health criteria, the current International Standard is an improvement on the Australian Standard which was based on the 1985 International Standard. The new standard should provide a truer indication of injury risk due to vibration than the older standard.
The various State Occupational Health and Safety Regulations apply to truck drivers and under these Regulations employers are required to ensure that the systems of work and the working environment of the employee are without risks to health and safety. This would also apply to vibration exposure. However, the Australian Standard for whole-body vibration is not cited in State OH&S Regulations. This means that employers and employees would need to comply with guidelines from the most appropriate Standard available. Being the most recent standard, ISO 2631-1997 is likely to be considered most appropriate.
The fatigue limits in the current Australian Standard have been abandoned in the current International Standard because they were not supported by research. Further research is required to establish realistic fatigue limits.
The guidelines for comfort in the International Standard seem to be reasonably well founded (Griffin 1990) and could be useful in rating truck drivers vibration exposures especially if the contribution of vibration in all axes is included in the assessment. Comfort levels could possibly form the basis for fatigue limits although extensive research would be necessary to confirm such a link.
The various State Occupational Health and Safety Regulations apply to truck drivers and under these Regulations employers are required to ensure that the systems of work and the working environment of the employee are without risks to health and safety. This would also apply to vibration exposure. However, the Australian Standard for whole-body vibration is not cited in State OH&S Regulations. This means that employers and employees would need to comply with guidelines from the most appropriate Standard available. Being the most recent standard, ISO 2631-1997 is likely to be considered most appropriate.
The fatigue limits in the current Australian Standard have been abandoned in the current International Standard because they were not supported by research. Further research is required to establish realistic fatigue limits.
The guidelines for comfort in the International Standard seem to be reasonably well founded (Griffin 1990) and could be useful in rating truck drivers vibration exposures especially if the contribution of vibration in all axes is included in the assessment. Comfort levels could possibly form the basis for fatigue limits although extensive research would be necessary to confirm such a link.
Monday, December 8, 2008
A Analysis of Long Distance Transport Companies in Australia
This report describes the results of a national survey of transport companies in Australia. The aim was to survey companies about knowledge and awareness of fatigue, about workrest scheduling practices and about the factors which underlie the way schedules are organised. The survey was designed to provide complimentary information to that obtained in a national survey of drivers undertaken at the same time, and reported elsewhere. Telephone interviews with 200 companies carrying freight over distances greater than 300km were undertaken, covering all regulated mainland states of Australia, and the Northern Territory. Companies were selected randomly from the telephone directory. The Northern Territory was included because it provided a comparison with an unregulated state. A middle management staff member, familiar with line haul operations was interviewed from each company. This report presents the main descriptive data obtained in the survey and provides an overview of views, knowledge and practices with respect to fatigue management. Key comparisons were drawn with the data obtained from the driver survey undertaken at the same time.
One of the key findings of this report was that there is a lag between increased awareness of fatigue and changes in operational practice. The majority of companies reported that awareness of fatigue had increased, both for themselves and their company, as well as for the industry at large over the last 5 years. However, from the results it seems that this increased awareness does not guarantee better management of the problem. Only half of the companies surveyed reported that they believed that fatigue was well managed in the industry and one fifth reported that it is badly managed. Even so, this is more optimistic compared with the verdict of drivers, half of whom reported that fatigue is badly managed in the industry.
Further evidence of the lag between increased awareness about fatigue in general and companies actually coming to grips with better management of the problem came from views of causes of and strategies to manage fatigue. Virtually all companies endorsed the significance of sleep and recovery before and during trips, and the contribution of long hours. However, other key contributors to fatigue were grossly underestimated. Company representatives failed to report the significance of night work as a prime contributor to fatigue and consolidated night sleep as prime strategy for reducing fatigue. Similarly, there was lack of recognition by companies of the substantial contribution of non-driving work, particularly loading and unloading, to the overall burden on drivers, and accordingly lack of endorsement of limits for such work as a fatigue management strategy. This picture is in sharp contrast to that presented by drivers, where awareness of the key contributors and likely effective strategies was much more in line with current knowledge.
It is hardly surprising that fatigue has become a more prominent feature of companies’ risk management agenda. There have been a number of high profile initiatives in safety promotions and legislative directions over the last decade all aiming to focus industry attention on better management of driver fatigue. The results of the survey highlight that increased awareness does not immediately translate into increased knowledge and operational changes.
This systemic inertia was also evident in the persistence of industry perceptions that the freight task needs to be maximally responsive to the demands of customers and freight forwarders, often described as the chain of responsibility. In fact, the picture presented by the companies themselves was rather different. The majority of companies reported that they have considerable control over schedules, with only a minority reporting that their work was mostly irregular. Strict estimated times of arrival were uncommon and trip times were mostly based on company and driver estimates, according to the companies surveyed. In other words, companies appear to have potential for far greater control over their schedules than is recognised or exercised.
The study provided some evidence that better attitudes to fatigue were associated with company practices that were more likely to manage fatigue effectively. For example, more aware companies were more likely to monitor fatigue and were more likely to change their schedules to accommodate driver fatigue. In contrast, companies who relied on the industry in general for management of fatigue and/or in the working hours regulations were less likely to be paying attention to the problem, were less likely to monitor fatigue and were more likely to change schedules to suit customer demands rather than for driver fatigue. They also used fewer management strategies and were less likely to otherwise restrict hours. These findings suggest that while attitudes do not seem to have a dramatic effect on practice, education and information for companies is a useful strategy for actively involving companies in better management of fatigue and for overcoming complacency about the driver fatigue problem.
Fatigue management strategies reported by companies surveyed focused on limitations of daily and weekly hours of service. Not surprisingly, there was less intervention and active management of fatigue for non-employee drivers. Active fatigue management strategies, monitoring of fatigue, or even formal policies for fatigue management for sub-contractor and independent drivers were reported by only a small minority of companies. Yet half of the companies surveyed reported that they hire these types of drivers. In many cases fatigue management for non-employee drivers is likely to become, by default, the responsibility of the individual driver. This is a serious problem because effective fatigue management is unlikely to emerge without not only company co-operation, but also active and formal company collaboration.
Surprisingly few differences were evident between companies of different sizes. Obvious and predictable structural differences were reported, for example greater reliance of smaller companies on non-employee drivers. Also predictably, formal policies and technical monitoring approaches were less common, reflecting the resource intensive nature of these strategies. However, little impact was seen of company size on the attitudes to fatigue and scheduling practices reported by companies surveyed. This pattern of findings suggests that the translation of fatigue awareness into operational practices is universally slow, and is not just a feature of some segments of the industry having reduced access to information and so forth.
Overall, this survey suggests that there is considerable scope for improving understanding and management of fatigue in the industry. Companies do not seem to be doing all that could be done to improve management of fatigue. Partly, this seems to reflect a lack of understanding about the phenomenon. There was poor understanding among line haul managers of how driver fatigue develops, the key role played by time of day and the contribution of total burden of work, not just driving. There needs to be greater
understanding in the industry that the problem requires a more sophisticated approach than simply restricting hours of driving. Education and information for companies is likely to be a useful strategy to alert companies to the most appropriate practices and to overcome complacency about the problem. The survey revealed that approaches affecting global attitudes, general increases in awareness and so forth, have had little impact on practices. On the other hand, they are likely to have been important for raising the profile of the problem in the industry and laying the groundwork for more targeted information and education. Indeed, it is hard to imagine how transport operators could develop the most effective interventions for their particular freight task, as demanded by Fatigue Management Programs, without being better informed. From the results of this survey, improved understanding of fatigue and its characteristics among transport managers must be seen as an immediate priority.
One of the key findings of this report was that there is a lag between increased awareness of fatigue and changes in operational practice. The majority of companies reported that awareness of fatigue had increased, both for themselves and their company, as well as for the industry at large over the last 5 years. However, from the results it seems that this increased awareness does not guarantee better management of the problem. Only half of the companies surveyed reported that they believed that fatigue was well managed in the industry and one fifth reported that it is badly managed. Even so, this is more optimistic compared with the verdict of drivers, half of whom reported that fatigue is badly managed in the industry.
Further evidence of the lag between increased awareness about fatigue in general and companies actually coming to grips with better management of the problem came from views of causes of and strategies to manage fatigue. Virtually all companies endorsed the significance of sleep and recovery before and during trips, and the contribution of long hours. However, other key contributors to fatigue were grossly underestimated. Company representatives failed to report the significance of night work as a prime contributor to fatigue and consolidated night sleep as prime strategy for reducing fatigue. Similarly, there was lack of recognition by companies of the substantial contribution of non-driving work, particularly loading and unloading, to the overall burden on drivers, and accordingly lack of endorsement of limits for such work as a fatigue management strategy. This picture is in sharp contrast to that presented by drivers, where awareness of the key contributors and likely effective strategies was much more in line with current knowledge.
It is hardly surprising that fatigue has become a more prominent feature of companies’ risk management agenda. There have been a number of high profile initiatives in safety promotions and legislative directions over the last decade all aiming to focus industry attention on better management of driver fatigue. The results of the survey highlight that increased awareness does not immediately translate into increased knowledge and operational changes.
This systemic inertia was also evident in the persistence of industry perceptions that the freight task needs to be maximally responsive to the demands of customers and freight forwarders, often described as the chain of responsibility. In fact, the picture presented by the companies themselves was rather different. The majority of companies reported that they have considerable control over schedules, with only a minority reporting that their work was mostly irregular. Strict estimated times of arrival were uncommon and trip times were mostly based on company and driver estimates, according to the companies surveyed. In other words, companies appear to have potential for far greater control over their schedules than is recognised or exercised.
The study provided some evidence that better attitudes to fatigue were associated with company practices that were more likely to manage fatigue effectively. For example, more aware companies were more likely to monitor fatigue and were more likely to change their schedules to accommodate driver fatigue. In contrast, companies who relied on the industry in general for management of fatigue and/or in the working hours regulations were less likely to be paying attention to the problem, were less likely to monitor fatigue and were more likely to change schedules to suit customer demands rather than for driver fatigue. They also used fewer management strategies and were less likely to otherwise restrict hours. These findings suggest that while attitudes do not seem to have a dramatic effect on practice, education and information for companies is a useful strategy for actively involving companies in better management of fatigue and for overcoming complacency about the driver fatigue problem.
Fatigue management strategies reported by companies surveyed focused on limitations of daily and weekly hours of service. Not surprisingly, there was less intervention and active management of fatigue for non-employee drivers. Active fatigue management strategies, monitoring of fatigue, or even formal policies for fatigue management for sub-contractor and independent drivers were reported by only a small minority of companies. Yet half of the companies surveyed reported that they hire these types of drivers. In many cases fatigue management for non-employee drivers is likely to become, by default, the responsibility of the individual driver. This is a serious problem because effective fatigue management is unlikely to emerge without not only company co-operation, but also active and formal company collaboration.
Surprisingly few differences were evident between companies of different sizes. Obvious and predictable structural differences were reported, for example greater reliance of smaller companies on non-employee drivers. Also predictably, formal policies and technical monitoring approaches were less common, reflecting the resource intensive nature of these strategies. However, little impact was seen of company size on the attitudes to fatigue and scheduling practices reported by companies surveyed. This pattern of findings suggests that the translation of fatigue awareness into operational practices is universally slow, and is not just a feature of some segments of the industry having reduced access to information and so forth.
Overall, this survey suggests that there is considerable scope for improving understanding and management of fatigue in the industry. Companies do not seem to be doing all that could be done to improve management of fatigue. Partly, this seems to reflect a lack of understanding about the phenomenon. There was poor understanding among line haul managers of how driver fatigue develops, the key role played by time of day and the contribution of total burden of work, not just driving. There needs to be greater
understanding in the industry that the problem requires a more sophisticated approach than simply restricting hours of driving. Education and information for companies is likely to be a useful strategy to alert companies to the most appropriate practices and to overcome complacency about the problem. The survey revealed that approaches affecting global attitudes, general increases in awareness and so forth, have had little impact on practices. On the other hand, they are likely to have been important for raising the profile of the problem in the industry and laying the groundwork for more targeted information and education. Indeed, it is hard to imagine how transport operators could develop the most effective interventions for their particular freight task, as demanded by Fatigue Management Programs, without being better informed. From the results of this survey, improved understanding of fatigue and its characteristics among transport managers must be seen as an immediate priority.
Tuesday, December 2, 2008
Evaluation of the optimum speed on urban residential streets
The optimum speed is defined as one which balances the social costs and benefits of increased travel time with decreased road trauma, vehicle operating costs, emissions, etc. The project focused on urban residential streets with 60 kmh speed limits because of the availability of a considerable amount of relevant basic data. Three different methods were considered to measure the impact of travel speed on road trauma and/or crash costs (Kloeden et al 1997, Nilsson 1984, Kallberg and Toivanen 1998). The relationships between cruise speed and average (all) speed found by SMEC (1998) were extrapolated to measure the impacts on travel time in residential streets for travel speeds in the range 35 to 85 kmh. The relationship between vehicle operating costs and travel speed was based on two Australian models given by Thoresen (2000). Air pollution emission rates at each travel speed were based on European relationships given by Ward et al (1998).
Tuesday, November 25, 2008
Investigation of fatigue-related crashes on Australian roads
Fatigue represents a significant social and economic cost to the community in relation to road crashes, especially fatal road crashes. Fatigue-related crashes are often more severe than other crashes as drivers reaction times are often delayed or drivers have not employed any crash avoidance manoeuvres. However, the identification of fatigue related crashes is hindered by the absence of a universally accepted definition of fatigue. Furthermore, it is difficult to quantify the level of driver fatigue due to the difficulties in objectively measuring the degree of fatigue following a crash.
The Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) has proposed an operational definition of a fatigue-related road crash that would provide a common, objectively based methodology. This definition should be useful in monitoring fatigue-related crashes and gauging trends over time or between regions. The definition is based on a set of well researched selection criteria and uses crash characteristics routinely collected by different traffic authorities.
The criteria for the operational definition implemented in this report included single vehicle crashes that occurred during critical times (midnight-6am and 2pm4pm), and head-on collisions where neither vehicle was overtaking at the time of the crash. Excluded were crashes that occurred on roads with speed limits under 80 km/h, or involved pedestrians or unlicensed drivers or drivers with high levels of alcohol (blood alcohol concentration over 0.05g/100ml).
Using this criteria, this study found that 16.6 per cent of fatal crashes in 1998 involved driver fatigue. When comparing among the States and Territories, the Northern Territory had the highest rate of fatigue-related crashes per 100 million vehicle kilometres travelled (0.66). However, within individual States and Territories, New South Wales had the highest percentage of fatal crashes involving driver fatigue (22.0 per cent). The study also found that between 1990 and 1998 the proportion of fatal crashes involving driver fatigue increased from 14.9 per cent in 1990 to 18.0 per cent in 1994, after which there was a decline to 16.6 per cent in 1998. This trend was also observed when the number of fatigue-related crashes was worked as a proportion of all fatal crashes 80km/h or over. This was done to take into account the fact that the number of fatal crashes occurring in speed zones of 80km/h or over increased throughout the 1990s and that roads have also been re-zoned over this time period.
The operational definition identified a relationship between the time and type of fatigue related crashes. More single vehicle crashes occurred in the early morning (midnight- 6am) than the afternoon (2pm-4pm). However, the incidence of head-on crashes was highest between midday and 6pm and lowest between midnight and 6am, this relationship may be related to traffic densities. That is, higher traffic densities during the day would increase the likelihood of fatigue-related crashes involving multiple vehicles in head-on collisions and, conversely, lower traffic densities during the early morning would increase the likelihood of fatigue-related crashes involving single vehicles.
Some of the findings of this study were similar to other studies in that the operational definition identified a higher number of male fatigued drivers/riders than female, and more fatigued drivers/riders under 29 years of age compared with older age groups. The operational definition and other studies also found that most early morning fatigued drivers/riders were less than 29 years of age, and fatigued drivers/riders over 50 years of age were involved in more afternoon crashes than in early morning crashes.
There also appeared to be a relationship between the age of the fatigued driver/rider and the type of fatigue-related crash (single vehicle or head-on). Single vehicle crashes involved a higher proportion of fatigued drivers/riders under 29 years of age compared with head-on crashes. However, fatigued drivers/riders over 50 years of age were involved in more head-on crashes. This relationship may be linked to the time of crash. That is, single vehicle crashes are more likely to occur in the early morning and early morning crashes are more likely to involve fatigued drivers/riders under 29 years of age. Therefore, single vehicle crashes involve more fatigued drivers/riders under 29 years of age. A similar argument could explain the relationship between older fatigued drivers/riders and head-on crashes.
Using the operational definition, 29.9 per cent of fatal articulated truck crashes in 1998 involved driver fatigue, which was almost twice the proportion of all fatal crashes involving fatigue (16.6 per cent). However when speed limits were controlled for, by only including those crashes occurring at crash sites with speed limits of 80km/h or over, the difference between articulated truck crashes and all crashes was smaller. That is, in 1998, 34.5 per cent of fatal articulated truck crashes in speed zones of 80km/h or over involved fatigue, whilst 24.9 per cent of all fatal crashes involved fatigue.
The operational definition also found that the proportion of fatigue-related articulated truck crashes between 1990 and 1998 increased from 31.0 per cent in 1990 to 38.6 per cent in 1994, and this was followed by a decrease to 29.9 per cent 1998. Similar trends were also observed when speed zones were controlled, with an initial increase in the proportion of fatigue-related crashes between 1990 and 1994, followed by a decrease till 1998.
Although fatigue is more highly represented in articulated truck crashes, this does not necessarily imply that the truck driver was the fatigued driver in a crash involving more than one vehicle. The fatigued driver in a head-on crash was identified by observing which vehicle had driven onto the wrong side of the road. Therefore, in head-on fatigue related crashes involving an articulated truck, truck drivers were estimated to be the fatigued driver in only 16.8 per cent of crashes, whilst passenger car drivers were fatigued in 66.0 per cent of crashes.
The identification of fatigue-related crashes by the operational definition was compared with fatigue-related crashes identified by coroners/police. While researchers generally acknowledge that coroners/police underestimate the incidence of fatigue, it was the only measure available for comparison in this report. The operational definition compared relatively well; however, two
limitations and possible modifications for the operational definition were highlighted. Firstly, nearly two-thirds of crashes identified as fatigue related by coroners/police, but not by the operational definition, were excluded because they were single vehicle crashes that did not occur during the critical time periods. Secondly, just over a third of crashes identified as fatigue-related by the operational definition, but not by the coroners/police, had been attributed to speed, drugs, or drugs and alcohol by coroners/police. This may suggest that the operational definition should be modified to exclude speed and drug related crashes, and extend the critical time periods for single vehicle crashes. However, excluding drug and speed related crashes may reduce the objectivity of the operational definition and the ability to consistently implement the definition across various traffic authorities. For instance the identification of speed involvement can vary between different traffic authorities, and not all drivers involved in fatal crashes are tested for drugs. Furthermore, extending the critical time periods may lead to an increase in the number of crashes falsely identified as fatigue-related. Clearly, more analysis is needed before the definition is modified.
In conclusion, while the operational definition may include some crashes that are not fatigue-related and exclude others that are, it nevertheless provides a practical and useful index of the relative incidence of fatigue-related crashes.
The Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) has proposed an operational definition of a fatigue-related road crash that would provide a common, objectively based methodology. This definition should be useful in monitoring fatigue-related crashes and gauging trends over time or between regions. The definition is based on a set of well researched selection criteria and uses crash characteristics routinely collected by different traffic authorities.
The criteria for the operational definition implemented in this report included single vehicle crashes that occurred during critical times (midnight-6am and 2pm4pm), and head-on collisions where neither vehicle was overtaking at the time of the crash. Excluded were crashes that occurred on roads with speed limits under 80 km/h, or involved pedestrians or unlicensed drivers or drivers with high levels of alcohol (blood alcohol concentration over 0.05g/100ml).
Using this criteria, this study found that 16.6 per cent of fatal crashes in 1998 involved driver fatigue. When comparing among the States and Territories, the Northern Territory had the highest rate of fatigue-related crashes per 100 million vehicle kilometres travelled (0.66). However, within individual States and Territories, New South Wales had the highest percentage of fatal crashes involving driver fatigue (22.0 per cent). The study also found that between 1990 and 1998 the proportion of fatal crashes involving driver fatigue increased from 14.9 per cent in 1990 to 18.0 per cent in 1994, after which there was a decline to 16.6 per cent in 1998. This trend was also observed when the number of fatigue-related crashes was worked as a proportion of all fatal crashes 80km/h or over. This was done to take into account the fact that the number of fatal crashes occurring in speed zones of 80km/h or over increased throughout the 1990s and that roads have also been re-zoned over this time period.
The operational definition identified a relationship between the time and type of fatigue related crashes. More single vehicle crashes occurred in the early morning (midnight- 6am) than the afternoon (2pm-4pm). However, the incidence of head-on crashes was highest between midday and 6pm and lowest between midnight and 6am, this relationship may be related to traffic densities. That is, higher traffic densities during the day would increase the likelihood of fatigue-related crashes involving multiple vehicles in head-on collisions and, conversely, lower traffic densities during the early morning would increase the likelihood of fatigue-related crashes involving single vehicles.
Some of the findings of this study were similar to other studies in that the operational definition identified a higher number of male fatigued drivers/riders than female, and more fatigued drivers/riders under 29 years of age compared with older age groups. The operational definition and other studies also found that most early morning fatigued drivers/riders were less than 29 years of age, and fatigued drivers/riders over 50 years of age were involved in more afternoon crashes than in early morning crashes.
There also appeared to be a relationship between the age of the fatigued driver/rider and the type of fatigue-related crash (single vehicle or head-on). Single vehicle crashes involved a higher proportion of fatigued drivers/riders under 29 years of age compared with head-on crashes. However, fatigued drivers/riders over 50 years of age were involved in more head-on crashes. This relationship may be linked to the time of crash. That is, single vehicle crashes are more likely to occur in the early morning and early morning crashes are more likely to involve fatigued drivers/riders under 29 years of age. Therefore, single vehicle crashes involve more fatigued drivers/riders under 29 years of age. A similar argument could explain the relationship between older fatigued drivers/riders and head-on crashes.
Using the operational definition, 29.9 per cent of fatal articulated truck crashes in 1998 involved driver fatigue, which was almost twice the proportion of all fatal crashes involving fatigue (16.6 per cent). However when speed limits were controlled for, by only including those crashes occurring at crash sites with speed limits of 80km/h or over, the difference between articulated truck crashes and all crashes was smaller. That is, in 1998, 34.5 per cent of fatal articulated truck crashes in speed zones of 80km/h or over involved fatigue, whilst 24.9 per cent of all fatal crashes involved fatigue.
The operational definition also found that the proportion of fatigue-related articulated truck crashes between 1990 and 1998 increased from 31.0 per cent in 1990 to 38.6 per cent in 1994, and this was followed by a decrease to 29.9 per cent 1998. Similar trends were also observed when speed zones were controlled, with an initial increase in the proportion of fatigue-related crashes between 1990 and 1994, followed by a decrease till 1998.
Although fatigue is more highly represented in articulated truck crashes, this does not necessarily imply that the truck driver was the fatigued driver in a crash involving more than one vehicle. The fatigued driver in a head-on crash was identified by observing which vehicle had driven onto the wrong side of the road. Therefore, in head-on fatigue related crashes involving an articulated truck, truck drivers were estimated to be the fatigued driver in only 16.8 per cent of crashes, whilst passenger car drivers were fatigued in 66.0 per cent of crashes.
The identification of fatigue-related crashes by the operational definition was compared with fatigue-related crashes identified by coroners/police. While researchers generally acknowledge that coroners/police underestimate the incidence of fatigue, it was the only measure available for comparison in this report. The operational definition compared relatively well; however, two
limitations and possible modifications for the operational definition were highlighted. Firstly, nearly two-thirds of crashes identified as fatigue related by coroners/police, but not by the operational definition, were excluded because they were single vehicle crashes that did not occur during the critical time periods. Secondly, just over a third of crashes identified as fatigue-related by the operational definition, but not by the coroners/police, had been attributed to speed, drugs, or drugs and alcohol by coroners/police. This may suggest that the operational definition should be modified to exclude speed and drug related crashes, and extend the critical time periods for single vehicle crashes. However, excluding drug and speed related crashes may reduce the objectivity of the operational definition and the ability to consistently implement the definition across various traffic authorities. For instance the identification of speed involvement can vary between different traffic authorities, and not all drivers involved in fatal crashes are tested for drugs. Furthermore, extending the critical time periods may lead to an increase in the number of crashes falsely identified as fatigue-related. Clearly, more analysis is needed before the definition is modified.
In conclusion, while the operational definition may include some crashes that are not fatigue-related and exclude others that are, it nevertheless provides a practical and useful index of the relative incidence of fatigue-related crashes.
Wednesday, November 19, 2008
Road fatal crash data research
Provides a single reference to frequently used historical road crash data for researchers, policy makers and other interested parties working in the area of road safety. It is based on data sourced from the Australian Transport Safety Bureau and the Australian Bureau of Statistics. It contains national data relating to fatal road crashes, population, vehicle registrations and kilometres travelled from 1925 to the present.
Wednesday, November 12, 2008
Potential Benefits and Costs of Speed Changes Assumption
1. The current speed limits on freeway standard and other divided rural roads are 110 km/h for cars and light commercial vehicles (LCVs) and 100 km/h for all rigid and articulated trucks, and the speed limit on undivided rural roads is 100 km/h for all types of vehicle.
2. Vehicles of each type cruise at their speed limit, so that their average speed is the same as the limit, unless their speed is reduced by slowing for curves or stopping in some parts of the road section.
3. Apart from where indicated, the rural roads are relatively straight without intersections and towns, allowing vehicles to travel at cruise speed throughout the whole road section.
4. The mix of traffic by vehicle type is the same on each class of rural road, namely 67% passenger cars, 20% light commercial vehicles, 5% rigid trucks and 8% articulated trucks, and that this mix does not vary by time of day on rural freeways and other divided roads.
5. Crashes involving material damage only, and no personal injury, were not included in the analysis of crash changes with speed, and the likely increase in these crashes with increased speeds (albeit to a lesser extent than fatal and injury crashes) was not valued. Material damage crashes represented about 16.3% of total crash costs in Australia during 1996 (BTE 2000).
6. Scenarios in which truck speed limits are lower than light vehicle limits have been analysed on the assumption that the (increased) speed differential between these vehicle types does not in itself increase crash risk or the severity of the crash outcome.
7. The changes in speed limits are assumed not to increase or reduce travel demand and traffic flows of each vehicle type on the road sections.
8. The travel time savings on the rural road sections are of sufficient magnitude to be aggregated and valued.
9. The current economic valuations of travel time, road trauma, and air pollution emissions provide an appropriate basis for analysis which summates their values, together with vehicle operating costs, in a way which represents the total social costs of each speed. In other words, the current valuations are an appropriate basis for ‘trading off’ these tangible and intangible values of each impact. (Results for some alternative valuations are also presented).
10. Assessment scenarios involving variable speed limit systems do not include any estimates of capital and maintenance costs for the systems.
11. Illustrative traffic volumes used in the analysis were 20,000 vehicles per day for freeways, 15,000 for divided highways and 1,000 for undivided roads.
2. Vehicles of each type cruise at their speed limit, so that their average speed is the same as the limit, unless their speed is reduced by slowing for curves or stopping in some parts of the road section.
3. Apart from where indicated, the rural roads are relatively straight without intersections and towns, allowing vehicles to travel at cruise speed throughout the whole road section.
4. The mix of traffic by vehicle type is the same on each class of rural road, namely 67% passenger cars, 20% light commercial vehicles, 5% rigid trucks and 8% articulated trucks, and that this mix does not vary by time of day on rural freeways and other divided roads.
5. Crashes involving material damage only, and no personal injury, were not included in the analysis of crash changes with speed, and the likely increase in these crashes with increased speeds (albeit to a lesser extent than fatal and injury crashes) was not valued. Material damage crashes represented about 16.3% of total crash costs in Australia during 1996 (BTE 2000).
6. Scenarios in which truck speed limits are lower than light vehicle limits have been analysed on the assumption that the (increased) speed differential between these vehicle types does not in itself increase crash risk or the severity of the crash outcome.
7. The changes in speed limits are assumed not to increase or reduce travel demand and traffic flows of each vehicle type on the road sections.
8. The travel time savings on the rural road sections are of sufficient magnitude to be aggregated and valued.
9. The current economic valuations of travel time, road trauma, and air pollution emissions provide an appropriate basis for analysis which summates their values, together with vehicle operating costs, in a way which represents the total social costs of each speed. In other words, the current valuations are an appropriate basis for ‘trading off’ these tangible and intangible values of each impact. (Results for some alternative valuations are also presented).
10. Assessment scenarios involving variable speed limit systems do not include any estimates of capital and maintenance costs for the systems.
11. Illustrative traffic volumes used in the analysis were 20,000 vehicles per day for freeways, 15,000 for divided highways and 1,000 for undivided roads.
Thursday, November 6, 2008
Bicycle helmets to effective preventing head injury
Bicycle helmets have been proven to be effective in preventing head injury. Based on the research findings, it is possible to list the proven attributes required for an effective helmet design. The major research study supporting the factor is appended to the finding, often the attribute will have been mentioned in several studies.
- A helmet must be worn properly to be effective, Attewell et al (2001);
- Helmets are very effective in preventing skull fracture, but less effective in preventing brain injury, Henderson (1995).
- The helmet must remain on the head during the crash, Williams (1991);
- The helmet must remain in position during the crash, Williams (1991);
- The helmet must have the maximum possible coverage of the frontal and temporal areas of the head, Williams (1991), Cameron et al (1994) and McIntosh et al (1998);
- The helmet must have adequate energy attenuation characteristics, for a variety of impacted surfaces, including flat, blunt and sharp, Smith et al (1993);
- A drop energy requirement of between 1.5 and 2.2 metres appears to be adequate, Williams (1991) and Smith et al (1993);
- The criteria for the energy attenuation test should be in the region of 200g, McIntosh et al (1998);
- The helmet must retain its integrity during the impact, Ching et al (1997) and Williams (1991);
- The helmet must be retained, in case of a second impact, Williams (1991) and Smith et al (1993);
- A helmet with a hard shell appears to offer better protection from severe brain injuries, Rivara et al (1996);
- Severe brain injury occurs more often in impacts with other vehicles, McDermot et al (1993);
- The helmet for a young child needs to be different than for an older child or adult, Corner et al (1987).
Based on the review of the helmet effectiveness literature, there are several aspects of the helmet performance immediately before and during a crash, which need to be considered when reviewing the adequacy of a standard. These are grouped here into three requirements with a short explanation (with the related tests from the standard):
1. The helmet must be worn. A helmet must be worn to have any effect, must be attractive and comfortable for the wearer to be willing to wear it.
2. The helmet must remain in place during the crash. The retention system must be capable of keeping the helmet in place during the events immediately before (dynamic stability) and during (retention system strength) the crash.
3. The helmet must have adequate energy attenuation. The helmet must be capable of attenuating the impact to minimise injury. The helmet must cover the appropriate areas of the head; especially the frontal and temporal areas (test coverage). It must not disintegrate from the impact (helmet integrity) and must be capable of adequately minimising injury to the head resulting from impacts with different types of objects (energy attenuation and load distribution). The helmet must continue to remain in place on the head for a possible second impact (order of testing).
1. The helmet must be worn. A helmet must be worn to have any effect, must be attractive and comfortable for the wearer to be willing to wear it.
2. The helmet must remain in place during the crash. The retention system must be capable of keeping the helmet in place during the events immediately before (dynamic stability) and during (retention system strength) the crash.
3. The helmet must have adequate energy attenuation. The helmet must be capable of attenuating the impact to minimise injury. The helmet must cover the appropriate areas of the head; especially the frontal and temporal areas (test coverage). It must not disintegrate from the impact (helmet integrity) and must be capable of adequately minimising injury to the head resulting from impacts with different types of objects (energy attenuation and load distribution). The helmet must continue to remain in place on the head for a possible second impact (order of testing).
Friday, October 31, 2008
Analysis for Heavy Truck Crashes at 500 to 1499 Kilometres
In 2001, National Transport Insurance Ltd (NTI) volunteered to forward heavy truck crash data to the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) for analysis. This report looks at NTI truck crash claims for 1998 to 2002. In an attempt to capture crashes predominantly involving the long-distance truck fleet, the analysis was confined to incidents where trucks were at least 500 kilometres outward distance from base. To eliminate the straggle of crashes at very long distances from base, a cut-off point of 1499 kilometres outward distance from base was used.
The NTI data show that approximately:
Knowing the outward distance from base means that it is possible to roughly estimate the number of hours a truck had been on the road prior to the crash.
The NTI data did not include details of injuries - fatal or otherwise - sustained by anyone involved in the crashes; therefore, for the purposes of this paper, any crash that incurred a claim of $10 000 or more has been defined by ATSB as a major crash.
Over the 1998 to 2002 period:
For both major and all crashes, the greatest proportion of crashes occurred during the morning quarter - 6am to noon - of a full day. The hours between 5am-7am appear to have been a particularly critical time for major truck crashes in the most recent two years of the data set, although there was also a noticeable peak at 10am in 2002, and at 7pm in 2001. Over the most recent three years, a shift in the time sector of major crashes was apparent.
By 2002:
For major crashes, the dominant crash types were:
The two dominant crash types were reversed in all crashes, whereby:
The group of crash types gathered together to loosely form the possible fatigue-or-speed related crashes (Ran off road, Failed to take bend, Rolled due to driver error, Driver fatigue, Head on collision and Excessive speed) accounted for:
Most rear end or failure to give way collisions (82 per cent) were not major crashes and most occurred between 6am-6pm (83 per cent). Similarly, the majority of turning, merging and lane changing incidents (87 per cent) were not major crashes and most occurred between 6am-6pm (77 per cent). Approximately half the collisions with animals or trains, jackknife or tyre failure incidents were major crashes and almost half occurred between 6am-6pm. Most of the crashes involving animals occurred overnight particularly between 6pm-midnight. Cattle were involved in well over half the major crashes with animals.
Looking at the possible fatigue-or-speed related crashes:
Interestingly, while the number of all crashes in the 500-1499 kilometres outward distance range decreased substantially in 2001, the possible fatigue-or-speed related crashes peaked in that year. That is, during 2001 the possible fatigue-or-speed related crashes, on average, increased slightly while other crash types reduced in volume. Possible fatigue-or-speed related crashes were more predominant during the months of August to December with a noticeable peak in August.
The majority of all crashes in the individual freight carrier categories occurred between noon-6pm, the only notable exception being Tipping crashes, which occurred predominantly between 6am-noon. However, if looking at only major crashes, the majority of crashes for most of the different freight carrier categories occurred in the 6am-noon sector.
It would appear that in truck crashes where driver fatigue was assessed as being implicated, the later in the day that the trip began, the shorter was the distance covered prior to the crash.
The NTI data show that approximately:
- 88 per cent of NTI crashes occurred within 500 kilometres from base;
- 2 per cent occurred at distances of 1500 kilometres or more; and
- the remaining 10 per cent of crashes, of which nearly three-quarters were on an outward leg of a trip, were in the 500-1499 kilometres from base range.
Knowing the outward distance from base means that it is possible to roughly estimate the number of hours a truck had been on the road prior to the crash.
The NTI data did not include details of injuries - fatal or otherwise - sustained by anyone involved in the crashes; therefore, for the purposes of this paper, any crash that incurred a claim of $10 000 or more has been defined by ATSB as a major crash.
Over the 1998 to 2002 period:
- 38 per cent of NTI truck crashes in the 500-1499 kilometres outward distance from base range fell into the major crash category.
- Peaks in major crashes occurred at 900-999 and 1100-1199 kilometres outward distances. For all crashes (ie. major plus non-major crashes), peaks occurred at 900-999 and 1200-1299 kilometres outward distances, although in 2002 a shift had begun to manifest whereby crashes had declined at 900-999 kilometres and increased at 1100-1199 kilometres outward distance from base.
- The majority of crashes occurred during the day.
- 60 per cent of major crashes occurred during the day, and
- 70 per cent of all crashes occurred during the day.
For both major and all crashes, the greatest proportion of crashes occurred during the morning quarter - 6am to noon - of a full day. The hours between 5am-7am appear to have been a particularly critical time for major truck crashes in the most recent two years of the data set, although there was also a noticeable peak at 10am in 2002, and at 7pm in 2001. Over the most recent three years, a shift in the time sector of major crashes was apparent.
By 2002:
- major crashes in the noon-6pm sector had halved (falling from 20 to 10 crashes), and
- major crashes between midnight-6am had almost doubled (increasing from 11 to 20 crashes).
For major crashes, the dominant crash types were:
- Ran off road (28 per cent), followed by
- Hit third party in rear (12 per cent).
The two dominant crash types were reversed in all crashes, whereby:
- Hit third party in rear was the most predominant (22 per cent), followed by
- Ran off road (14 per cent).
The group of crash types gathered together to loosely form the possible fatigue-or-speed related crashes (Ran off road, Failed to take bend, Rolled due to driver error, Driver fatigue, Head on collision and Excessive speed) accounted for:
- 52 per cent of major crashes; and
- 27 per cent of all crashes.
Most rear end or failure to give way collisions (82 per cent) were not major crashes and most occurred between 6am-6pm (83 per cent). Similarly, the majority of turning, merging and lane changing incidents (87 per cent) were not major crashes and most occurred between 6am-6pm (77 per cent). Approximately half the collisions with animals or trains, jackknife or tyre failure incidents were major crashes and almost half occurred between 6am-6pm. Most of the crashes involving animals occurred overnight particularly between 6pm-midnight. Cattle were involved in well over half the major crashes with animals.
Looking at the possible fatigue-or-speed related crashes:
- over three-quarters of these were categorised as major crashes;
- nearly 60 per cent of all possible fatigue-or-speed related crashes occurred between 6am-6pm, and over half of these crashes were Ran off road crash type; and
- the most critical time for possible fatigue-or-speed crashes appeared to be between 3am-8am.
Interestingly, while the number of all crashes in the 500-1499 kilometres outward distance range decreased substantially in 2001, the possible fatigue-or-speed related crashes peaked in that year. That is, during 2001 the possible fatigue-or-speed related crashes, on average, increased slightly while other crash types reduced in volume. Possible fatigue-or-speed related crashes were more predominant during the months of August to December with a noticeable peak in August.
The majority of all crashes in the individual freight carrier categories occurred between noon-6pm, the only notable exception being Tipping crashes, which occurred predominantly between 6am-noon. However, if looking at only major crashes, the majority of crashes for most of the different freight carrier categories occurred in the 6am-noon sector.
It would appear that in truck crashes where driver fatigue was assessed as being implicated, the later in the day that the trip began, the shorter was the distance covered prior to the crash.
Monday, October 20, 2008
Road Deaths Australia, Monthly Bulletin; April 2008
Road Deaths Australia is a monthly bulletin presenting the latest fatal road crash data as well as recent historical comparisons. It is produced by the department using monthly data supplied by the eight states and territories.
- There was a total of 113 road deaths in April 2008.
- this is an 18.1 per cent decrease from the April 2007 figure. - There have been 474 road deaths in 2008 to the end of April.
- this is a 12.5 per cent decrease from the same 4 month period in 2007.
Monday, October 13, 2008
Road transport documentation required with applications
As part of their application the operator must give a brief overview of their operations and must provide the following details:
- The name, ABN and bus operation licence/accreditation of the operator who is applying;
- Evidence of an existing contract between the operator and a state/territory to provide school bus services on a route defined as regional or rural;
- Details of any routes serviced by the operator that have been assessed under the voluntary National Guidelines for Risk Assessment of School Bus Routes or, where they have not been so assessed, details of routes serviced by the operator containing roads with speed limits greater than 80 km/h;
- Details of any other aspects of the serviced routes that could be relevant to the assessment of the operators application (e.g. narrow and steep terrain);
- The VIN(s), the Identification Plate Approval number(s) (for the purposes of the Motor Vehicle Standards Act 1989) and a copy of registration documents, where available, of the nominated bus(es);
- Evidence that the buses nominated under the subsidy program have been approved by a state/territory as suitable to provide the services specified by the school bus contract noted above;
- The nature of the work to be undertaken and the costs involved, including any quotations to undertake the work;
- The amount of assistance requested (up to $25,000 per eligible bus);
- Details of any existing funding provided by state/territory programs for any of the buses nominated.
Tuesday, October 7, 2008
Aviation Statistics AR-2008-057, Aviation transport Statistics: 1 January 1998 to 30 June 2008
The ATSB has changed the way in which aviation transport statistics are presented. This report represents the first in an ongoing series of reports provided in the new format. The report encompasses a rolling 10-year reporting cycle and replaces all individual spreadsheets previously available.
This report provides aviation accident and incident, collectively termed occurrence, data for the period 1 January 1998 to 30 June 2008. This data was provided to the Australian Transport Safety Bureau by 'responsible persons' as defined in the Transport Safety Investigation Regulations 2003, Part 2.5. The data excludes non-VH registered operations in the sports aviation category, and is current as at 30 June 2008.
The data will be adjusted quarterly to reflect new information received during the reporting period
This report provides aviation accident and incident, collectively termed occurrence, data for the period 1 January 1998 to 30 June 2008. This data was provided to the Australian Transport Safety Bureau by 'responsible persons' as defined in the Transport Safety Investigation Regulations 2003, Part 2.5. The data excludes non-VH registered operations in the sports aviation category, and is current as at 30 June 2008.
The data will be adjusted quarterly to reflect new information received during the reporting period
Monday, September 29, 2008
Endeavours of Ministry of Surface Transport
Around 70,000 lives are lost and about3.50 lakhs persons are injured on Indian roads every year. These apart from causing enormous misery and hardship to those affected. Inflict a heavy monetary toll on the economy. According to a rough estimate the total economy loss to the country on account of road accidents is estimated to be about Rs. 5000 crores every year which comes to about 0.5 % of the Gross Domestic Product of the country. This does not include the cost of pain, grief and suffering by the families of the victims.
The Ministry of Surface Transport has taken a number of steps in order to improve road safety in the country. These include widening and strengthening of roads, improvement of intersections, replacement of level crossing with road over / under bridges, provision of retro-reflective road signs and thermoplastic road marking and setting up wayside amenities on the highways for passengers and vehicles. The Ministry is also introducing amendments to the Motor Vehicles Act with a view to tightening the provisions relating to driving skills and fitness of vehicles including enhancement of penalties for various traffic offences.
On the educational side the Government has been undertaking various publicity campaigns to inculcate road safety consciousness among various sections of road users. These include publicity through print and electronics media like news paper, T.V. and radio, screening of cinema slides, computerised animation display, display on colour railings, advertisement through closed circuit T. V. system, distribution of calendars, tin plates, Road Safety Games, wall paintings depicting road safety messages etc.
The Ministry of Surface Transport has taken a number of steps in order to improve road safety in the country. These include widening and strengthening of roads, improvement of intersections, replacement of level crossing with road over / under bridges, provision of retro-reflective road signs and thermoplastic road marking and setting up wayside amenities on the highways for passengers and vehicles. The Ministry is also introducing amendments to the Motor Vehicles Act with a view to tightening the provisions relating to driving skills and fitness of vehicles including enhancement of penalties for various traffic offences.
On the educational side the Government has been undertaking various publicity campaigns to inculcate road safety consciousness among various sections of road users. These include publicity through print and electronics media like news paper, T.V. and radio, screening of cinema slides, computerised animation display, display on colour railings, advertisement through closed circuit T. V. system, distribution of calendars, tin plates, Road Safety Games, wall paintings depicting road safety messages etc.
Tuesday, September 23, 2008
Transport traffic offences
Mobility with safety is the guiding principle for the Meghalaya Traffic Police. To achieve this, the action plan rests on four pillars or ERER i.e. Education, Regulation, Enforcement and Road Engineering. Challaning (Enforcement) is the last priority and has to be undertaken as some road users violate traffic rules endangering safety of others.
Police officers of the rank of Sub-Inspector in Meghalaya Traffic Police and above are authorized to compound certain traffic offences. If a person does not choose the option of compounding or the officer is not competent to compound the traffic offence, challans are sent to Traffic Challaning Branch. A period of 14 days is given to the person to pay the compounding fee at the Traffic Challaning Branch. Thereafter, Challans are sent to the Court. Compounding amounting for the various offences is given in the table below.
Police officers of the rank of Sub-Inspector in Meghalaya Traffic Police and above are authorized to compound certain traffic offences. If a person does not choose the option of compounding or the officer is not competent to compound the traffic offence, challans are sent to Traffic Challaning Branch. A period of 14 days is given to the person to pay the compounding fee at the Traffic Challaning Branch. Thereafter, Challans are sent to the Court. Compounding amounting for the various offences is given in the table below.
Friday, September 19, 2008
Seat Belt Use at Record Level in 2008
More Americans are buckling up than ever before, Secretary of Transportation Mary E. Peters said Sept. 17. In 2008, 83 percent of all vehicle occupants are using seat belts during daylight hours — up from 82 percent in 2007, according to NHTSA. “We have seen seat belt use rising steadily every year and that means more and more lives are being saved and countless serious injuries prevented,” said Peters. NHTSA estimates approximately 270 lives are saved for every one percent increase in belt use.
Tuesday, September 16, 2008
ALCOHOL MISUSE
The primary objective of the controlled substances use and alcohol misuse program is deterrence rather than detection. Public safety is best served if drivers are aware of the effects of alcohol and controlled substances on health, safety, and the work environment.
Consequently, the FMCSA believes that educating drivers and training supervisors are
essential for these programs to be effective. Employers are required to provide educational materials for drivers training for supervisors prior to the start of testing
Furthermore, the FMCSA regulations and associated DOT regulations specify the involvement of professional and technical personnel in the administration of your alcohol and controlled substances program. These personnel include the medical review officer (MRO), the substance abuse professional (SAP), the screening test
Consequently, the FMCSA believes that educating drivers and training supervisors are
essential for these programs to be effective. Employers are required to provide educational materials for drivers training for supervisors prior to the start of testing
Furthermore, the FMCSA regulations and associated DOT regulations specify the involvement of professional and technical personnel in the administration of your alcohol and controlled substances program. These personnel include the medical review officer (MRO), the substance abuse professional (SAP), the screening test
Friday, September 12, 2008
Safety Belts Save Lives and Dollars
- In 2003, safety belts saved society an estimated $63 billion in medical care, lost productivity, and other injury-related costs. In this same year, the needless deaths and injuries from safety belt nonuse caused an estimated $18 billion in economic costs to society.
- It is estimated safety belts saved more than 14,900 lives in the United States in 2003. Yet, during this same year, 56 percent of passenger vehicle occupants killed in traffic crashes were unrestrained. If all passenger vehicle occupants (over 4 years old) wore safety belts, more than 6,000 additional lives could have been saved.
- Research has shown that lap/shoulder belts, when used properly, reduce the risk of fatal injury to front-seat passenger car occupants by 45 percent and the risk of moderate to critical injury by 50 percent. For light-truck occupants, safety belts reduce the risk of fatal injury by 60 percent and moderate-to-critical injury by 65 percent.
- Safety belts should always be worn, even when riding in vehicles equipped with air bags. Air bags are designed to work with safety belts, not alone. In 2003, an estimated 2,488 lives were saved by air bags.
Wednesday, September 10, 2008
Restrict passengers
Teen passengers in a vehicle can distract a beginning driver and/or lead to greater risk-taking.Because young drivers often transport their friends, there’s a teen passenger problem as well as a teen driver problem. About 6 of every 10 teenage passenger deaths (59%) during 2003 occurred in crashes with a teen driver. While night driving with passengers is particularly lethal, many fatal crashes with teen passengers occur during the day.The best policy is to restrict teenage passengers, especially multiple teens, all the time.
Graduated Licensing Can Help
Teenagers perceive a driver’s license as a ticket to freedom.It’s momentous for parents, too. Though they are oftenaware of 16-year-olds’ high crash risks, they’re relieved not to have to chauffeur their children around anymore. But the price is steep. Crashes are the leading cause of death among American teens, accounting for more than one third of all deaths of 16- to 18-year-olds.
An effective way to reduce this toll is to enact graduated licensing, under which driving privileges are phased in to restrict beginners’ initial experience behind the wheel to lower-risk situations. The restrictions gradually are lifted, so teenagers are more experienced and mature when they get their full, unrestricted licenses.
Graduated systems that are well designed restrict night driving, limit teen passengers, set zero alcohol tolerance, and require a specified amount of supervised practice during the initial phase. Graduated licensing laws have reduced teens’ crash rates in the United States, Canada, and New Zealand. But not all States have such laws, and the laws aren’t all strong.
An effective way to reduce this toll is to enact graduated licensing, under which driving privileges are phased in to restrict beginners’ initial experience behind the wheel to lower-risk situations. The restrictions gradually are lifted, so teenagers are more experienced and mature when they get their full, unrestricted licenses.
Graduated systems that are well designed restrict night driving, limit teen passengers, set zero alcohol tolerance, and require a specified amount of supervised practice during the initial phase. Graduated licensing laws have reduced teens’ crash rates in the United States, Canada, and New Zealand. But not all States have such laws, and the laws aren’t all strong.
ALCOHOL MISUSE
The primary objective of the controlled substances use and alcohol misuse program is deterrence rather than detection. Public safety is best served if drivers are aware of the effects of alcohol and controlled substances on health, safety, and the work environment.
Consequently, the FMCSA believes that educating drivers and training supervisors are
essential for these programs to be effective. Employers are required to provide educational materials for drivers (see Chapter 3) and training for supervisors prior to the start of testing .
Furthermore, the FMCSA regulations and associated DOT regulations (49 CFR part 40) specify the involvement of professional and technical personnel in the administration of your alcohol and controlled substances program. These personnel include the medical review officer (MRO), the substance abuse professional (SAP), the screening test
Consequently, the FMCSA believes that educating drivers and training supervisors are
essential for these programs to be effective. Employers are required to provide educational materials for drivers (see Chapter 3) and training for supervisors prior to the start of testing .
Furthermore, the FMCSA regulations and associated DOT regulations (49 CFR part 40) specify the involvement of professional and technical personnel in the administration of your alcohol and controlled substances program. These personnel include the medical review officer (MRO), the substance abuse professional (SAP), the screening test
Thursday, August 28, 2008
Check exterior body panels and fittings
- Exterior body work including mudguards, bullbars, roof racks etc on a vehicle have exposed sharp edges (including corrosion or accident damage) that could injure a person who comes into contact with that part of the vehicle
- Mudguards are not properly fitted to provide protection over the full width of the wheels and tyres and any mudguard does not extend inboard over the full width of the tyre/s (except where part of the body of the vehicle acts as a mudguard)
- The bottom edge of mudguard and/or mudflap at the rear of any vehicle is higher off the ground that 1/3 of the horizontal distance between the centre of the axle and the mudguard
- Spray suppression devices are not fitted to ‘B’ Double combinations in accordance with Rule 33 Australian Vehicle Standard Rules or in those states that have granted exemption (
Tuesday, August 26, 2008
Safety Belt Enforcement Programs
- ` Occupant Protection Selective Traffic Enforcement Programs (sTEPs) involve periods of highly visible safety belt law enforcement combined with extensive media support. These programs are a proven method to rapidly change motorists' safety belt use behavior. Successful Occupant Protection sTEPs have been documented in Canada, Europe, and the United States.
- Highly visible enforcement of safety belt laws is a core strategy to increase safety belt use. States and communities have greater success in achieving increased safety belt use when there is strong enforcement of the law, along with effective media support.27 This strong enforcement of safety belt laws sends the message that the State takes safety belt use laws seriously. Ultimately, this leads to greater compliance.
- The Click It or Ticket (CIOT) model has been enormously successful in increasing safety belt use at the community, State, and regional level. This nationwide initiative, a partnership involving NHTSA, the Air Bag & Seat Belt Safety Campaign, and hundreds of law enforcement agencies, increased national belt use by four percentage points in 2003.28 Safety belt use increased again in 2004, reaching an all-time high of 80 percent.
Monday, August 25, 2008
Check mirrors
- Any reflective surface of a compulsory rear view mirror:
- has a missing section;
- is cracked;
- is deteriorated;
- is obscured;
- where fitted to the right side, does not have a flat surface of at least 150cm2 (it may also incorporate a curved portion).
- Mirrors are not securely mounted or missing;
- Any compulsory left side mirror does not have a reflecting surface of at least 150 cm2;
- Any compulsory mirror does not provide a clear view of the road to the rear of the vehicle.
Visually inspect fuel lines, joints and connections
- where the vehicle body or chassis members do not provide protection for fuel lines under the vehicle, the piping is not shielded or encased in a protective sleeve;
- the sleeving of any fuel line routed under the vehicle is damaged such that the fuel line is exposed;
- any supporting clips (required to be spaced at intervals of 600mm) are missing or do not provide effective support to the fuel line;
- any provision has been made to allow use of the gas fuel for purposes other than as automotive fuel.
Friday, August 22, 2008
Check fifth wheels/turntables
- Where ADR 62 applies, the fifth wheel/turntable does not display the manufacturer’s name/trademark, nominal size (eg 50mm) and the gross mass rating;
- The mating parts of a coupling used to connect a semi-trailer to a towing vehicle allow the semi-trailer to roll to an extent that makes the towing vehicle unstable (eg quick release turntable fitted to a ballrace turntable);
- The top and bottom mounting flanges have insufficient effective fasteners (eg ballrace);
- Fasteners either side of the mounting frame, plate or pivot brackets are insufficient or ineffective;
- Fifth wheel/turntable mounting plate or sub frame assembly securing bolts are missing, broken or loose, or the fasteners are "U" bolts;
- There is movement between the fixed mounting components;
- There is more than 5 mm horizontal movement between:
Thursday, August 21, 2008
Check brake components
- Abrasions or cuts on brake hoses penetrate further than the outer protective covering;
- Brake pipes, hoses and connections are cracked, broken, kinked, crimped, damaged by heat or have visible signs of leakage, swelling or bulging;
- Brake drums or discs are not fitted or have missing pieces, or cracks other than short heat cracks inside the drums;
- Drums or discs are worn beyond manufacturers specifications;
- Any caliper, wheel cylinder or master cylinder leaks;
- Linings or pads are contaminated with oil, grease or brake fluid;
- The thickness of the linings or pads is less than the manufacturer’s recommended minimum. If this is not known or is no longer appropriate, the thickness of the linings or pads is less than
Check brake components
- Brake pedals do not have an anti-slip surface across the complete surface;
- Brake pedals or handles are broken or missing;
- Brake control mountings, pivots, cables or links are kinked, loose, broken, excessively worn or binding;
- A ratchet or locking device on a parking brake control does not hold the parking brake in the applied position;
- Park brake control can be released with only one action;
Wednesday, August 20, 2008
SafeStat
SafeStat (short for Motor Carrier Safety Status Measurement System) is an automated, data driven analysis system designed by the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA). SafeStat combines current and historical carrier-based safety performance information to measure the relative (peer-to-peer) safety fitness of interstate commercial motor carriers and intrastate commercial motor carriers that transport hazardous materials. This information includes Federal and State data on crashes, roadside inspections, on-site compliance review results and enforcement history. SafeStat enables FMCSA to quantify and monitor the safety status of individual motor carriers on a monthly basis and thereby focus enforcement resources on carriers posing the greatest potential safety risk.
The States are required to provide standard, basic information about large truck and bus crashes to FMCSA within 90 days of the crash event, and the results of roadside inspections within 21 days of inspection. However, the completeness, timeliness and accuracy of crash data – and to a lesser extent roadside inspection data – vary from state-to-state. Accordingly, SafeStat’s ability to accurately and objectively assess the safety fitness of individual motor carriers may be inconsistent and not conclusive without additional analysis.
The States are required to provide standard, basic information about large truck and bus crashes to FMCSA within 90 days of the crash event, and the results of roadside inspections within 21 days of inspection. However, the completeness, timeliness and accuracy of crash data – and to a lesser extent roadside inspection data – vary from state-to-state. Accordingly, SafeStat’s ability to accurately and objectively assess the safety fitness of individual motor carriers may be inconsistent and not conclusive without additional analysis.
Tuesday, August 19, 2008
Going Home for the Playoffs
When their 16-year-old son Gabriel missed his Friday night curfew, Charles and Maureen Puccia started to fear the worst. They wouldn’t know for hours that Gabe had died with two teenage friends in a crash earlier that night.
Gabe’s night started out without much of a plan. He and some friends were supposed to meet at a pancake house, but only a few people showed up. That’s when Gabe and others headed home to watch the playoffs. None had been drinking, and they had only two miles to drive. But 17year-old Matt was going about twice the speed limit when the car veered off the road and hit a tree.
Gabe’s parents had to make several calls just to get the news.“He had one of those little earrings in his ear, and a special jacket he had bought in Italy,” Charles recalls. “And the guy at the hospital said,‘I think we have your son.’ Our grief is for Gabe’s loss, not our own — to not know what we could have done for him and to not watch him find whatever it was he wanted in life.”
Now the Puccias focus on their younger son, Emilio.“This is a case where we’re willing to go all the way, enforcing the graduated licensing law to the utmost and beyond.”
Gabe’s night started out without much of a plan. He and some friends were supposed to meet at a pancake house, but only a few people showed up. That’s when Gabe and others headed home to watch the playoffs. None had been drinking, and they had only two miles to drive. But 17year-old Matt was going about twice the speed limit when the car veered off the road and hit a tree.
Gabe’s parents had to make several calls just to get the news.“He had one of those little earrings in his ear, and a special jacket he had bought in Italy,” Charles recalls. “And the guy at the hospital said,‘I think we have your son.’ Our grief is for Gabe’s loss, not our own — to not know what we could have done for him and to not watch him find whatever it was he wanted in life.”
Now the Puccias focus on their younger son, Emilio.“This is a case where we’re willing to go all the way, enforcing the graduated licensing law to the utmost and beyond.”
Wednesday, August 13, 2008
Motor Carrier Matching
Complete and accurate carrier information is very important when qualifying vehicles recorded on a State's accident report are entered into the Crash Module of SAFETYNET. This collection of crash data allows FMCSA to identify carriers who are potentially “unsafe” for application of enforcement measures. To perform this identification, carriers involved in qualifying crashes are "matched" to their profile compiled in the Motor Carrier Management Information System (MCMIS). Their profile is a historical record of inspection and safety audit information recorded in the SAFETYNET Inspection Module combined with the data collected in the Crash Module. In order for FMCSA to take appropriate action, the process of matching carriers to the proper record is critical.
Carrier Identification
The information on interstate or intrastate carriers is provided to the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration which uses the data to target unsafe carriers for more in-depth investigations. A poor safety record can lead to a carrier losing its operating authority. Missing or inaccurate carrier information when reporting on a qualifying crash can allow “unsafe” carriers to escape regulation or cause “safe” carriers to inappropriately have their safety records affected. Consequently, when reporting crashes it is critical to report the correct carrier name, number and address.
NOTE: The companies and carriers shown in the photographs on this site are included for illustrative purposes only. These images in NO WAY indicate or imply unsafe or improper operating practices by those pictured.
NOTE: The companies and carriers shown in the photographs on this site are included for illustrative purposes only. These images in NO WAY indicate or imply unsafe or improper operating practices by those pictured.
Friday, August 8, 2008
Safety and Security Technology Deployment
Over the past several years, FMCSA has been involved in efforts to test, evaluate, and encourage the deployment of onboard safety and security systems, such as collision warning systems with adaptive cruise control, stability control systems, lane departure warning systems, and vehicle tracking systems. Through systematic deployment planning for onboard systems, FMCSA continues to be engaged in industry-government partnerships to conduct studies and relay information to promote commercial motor vehicle (CMV) safety and security.
Through this collaboration, functional specifications were developed to relay a better understanding of the functions of onboard safety and security systems and to provide insight into the safety and efficiency benefits of using the systems. FMCSA has recently released Commercial Motor Vehicle Onboard Safety and Security Systems Technology Product Guides on its website, which provides a portfolio of existing and emerging safety and security system technologies for the motor carrier industry. The purpose of this information on this site is to assist carriers, drivers, fleet managers, and other interested individuals in learning more about available safety and security systems. Currently, FMCSA is working on completing analyses of the costs and benefits of these systems and assessing the use of the systems by the industry. In the future, FMCSA plans to perform expanded testing of onboard safety systems to identify and resolve technology adoption issues, confirm and extrapolate safety and productivity benefits to the broader industry, and develop focused deployment efforts to promote expanded adoption of the systems by industry.
Through this collaboration, functional specifications were developed to relay a better understanding of the functions of onboard safety and security systems and to provide insight into the safety and efficiency benefits of using the systems. FMCSA has recently released Commercial Motor Vehicle Onboard Safety and Security Systems Technology Product Guides on its website, which provides a portfolio of existing and emerging safety and security system technologies for the motor carrier industry. The purpose of this information on this site is to assist carriers, drivers, fleet managers, and other interested individuals in learning more about available safety and security systems. Currently, FMCSA is working on completing analyses of the costs and benefits of these systems and assessing the use of the systems by the industry. In the future, FMCSA plans to perform expanded testing of onboard safety systems to identify and resolve technology adoption issues, confirm and extrapolate safety and productivity benefits to the broader industry, and develop focused deployment efforts to promote expanded adoption of the systems by industry.
Wednesday, August 6, 2008
Safety Belt Technology to Increase Comfort and Safety – SBIR, Phases I and II
Based on the finding in the Safety Belt Countermeasure Study, FMCSA will initiate a Safety Belt SBIR Project starting FY 2007. Phase 1 is Proof of Concept. Phase 2 is principal R&D. (Participation in the SBIR program is Congressionally directed.) FMCSA research has shown that about 55% of commercial motor vehicles (vehicles 10,000 pounds or greater that operate in interstate commerce) drivers buckle their safety belt as compared to abut 85% of passenger vehicle drivers. Increasing safety belt usage by commercial motor vehicle (CMV) drivers is an FMCSA and DOT priority. It is envisioned that this device will be low cost, reliable, comfortable, rugged, and user-friendly, to increase comfort and/or encourage safety belt usage by CMV drivers. Ideas such as window stickers or other similar decals to remind a driver to buckle up will not be considered for this program. Proposers were required to certify that to the best of their knowledge, no such product exists, has been patented, or is patent pending. Examples of potential concepts, if they do not already currently exist for CMVs as discussed above, could include safety belt attachments such as uniquely designed pads or cushions and electronic monitors in connection with onboard recorders.
Tuesday, August 5, 2008
Visually inspect the LPG/NGV or CNG container
- the boot lid torsion bars, coil springs or hinges contact the container;
- the container and its surface mounted fittings are not protected from damage by vehicle component (e.g. tail shaft) failure;33
- where mounted within a cargo space the container is not protected from impact from cargo or other objects carried in that area, i.e. it is not installed within an enclosed protective compartment;
- the container or its gas carrying components are located within 150mm of a heat source and there is no heat shield;
- the container is incorrectly aligned so that it impedes access to the container service valve;
- the container is incorrectly aligned so that it impairs the operation of the ullage valve or the automatic fill limiter (AFL);
- Where containers installed on or after 1 July 1988 have a wall thickness marked to be less than 2.2mm:
Monday, August 4, 2008
Safety and Security Technology Deployment
Over the past several years, FMCSA has been involved in efforts to test, evaluate, and encourage the deployment of onboard safety and security systems, such as collision warning systems with adaptive cruise control, stability control systems, lane departure warning systems, and vehicle tracking systems. Through systematic deployment planning for onboard systems, FMCSA continues to be engaged in industry-government partnerships to conduct studies and relay information to promote commercial motor vehicle (CMV) safety and security.
Through this collaboration, functional specifications were developed to relay a better understanding of the functions of onboard safety and security systems and to provide insight into the safety and efficiency benefits of using the systems. FMCSA has recently released Commercial Motor Vehicle Onboard Safety and Security Systems Technology Product Guides on its website, which provides a portfolio of existing and emerging safety and security system technologies for the motor carrier industry. The purpose of this information on this site is to assist carriers, drivers, fleet managers, and other interested individuals in learning more about available safety and security systems. Currently, FMCSA is working on completing analyses of the costs and benefits of these systems and assessing the use of the systems by the industry. In the future, FMCSA plans to perform expanded testing of onboard safety systems to identify and resolve technology adoption issues, confirm and extrapolate safety and productivity benefits to the broader industry, and develop focused deployment efforts to promote expanded adoption of the systems by industry.
Through this collaboration, functional specifications were developed to relay a better understanding of the functions of onboard safety and security systems and to provide insight into the safety and efficiency benefits of using the systems. FMCSA has recently released Commercial Motor Vehicle Onboard Safety and Security Systems Technology Product Guides on its website, which provides a portfolio of existing and emerging safety and security system technologies for the motor carrier industry. The purpose of this information on this site is to assist carriers, drivers, fleet managers, and other interested individuals in learning more about available safety and security systems. Currently, FMCSA is working on completing analyses of the costs and benefits of these systems and assessing the use of the systems by the industry. In the future, FMCSA plans to perform expanded testing of onboard safety systems to identify and resolve technology adoption issues, confirm and extrapolate safety and productivity benefits to the broader industry, and develop focused deployment efforts to promote expanded adoption of the systems by industry.
Thursday, July 31, 2008
Check trailer brakes and breakaway protection
- For trailers with a gross trailer mass (GTM) in excess of 2 tonnes, the trailer service brakes do not operate immediately the trailer service hose coupling or connection is disconnected from the towing vehicle and do not remain fully applied for at least 15 minutes;
- A truck trailer interconnecting flexible hose and coupling is not properly mated or secured;
- For trailers with a GTM in excess of 2 tonnes the trailer brakes are not capable of being applied and released from the normal driving position;
- Any trailer having brakes which are air or vacuum assisted is not fitted with a reservoir that is protected by a check valve;
- Any trailer having brakes which are air or vacuum assisted is not built to provide a visible or audible warning to the driver of the towing vehicle, while the driver is in a normal driving position, of a lack of air or vacuum.
Road Infrastructure
The Department continually monitors the condition of roads throughout the province for the purpose of planning, maintenance and reconstruction. In 2006, approximately 60 % of the paved road network was measured by “road roughness testing”, dynamic cone penetration (DCP) and evaluation of skid resistance.
The Departmental technical centre also conducted research with a view to locating mapping and evaluating material sources for road building in the province. A number of material sources have been tested for suitability.
The Department continues to use the bridge management software programme developed by the CSIR to manage 1,610 bridges and 2,008 culverts in the province. In 2006 a visual inspection of 323 bridges and 267 culverts was conducted.
The department uses the Road Management System (RMS) to provide a scientific basis for evaluating the condition of paved and unpaved road networks. Pavement Management Systems (PMS) and Gravel Road Management Systems (GRMS) are also used.
The Departmental technical centre also conducted research with a view to locating mapping and evaluating material sources for road building in the province. A number of material sources have been tested for suitability.
The Department continues to use the bridge management software programme developed by the CSIR to manage 1,610 bridges and 2,008 culverts in the province. In 2006 a visual inspection of 323 bridges and 267 culverts was conducted.
The department uses the Road Management System (RMS) to provide a scientific basis for evaluating the condition of paved and unpaved road networks. Pavement Management Systems (PMS) and Gravel Road Management Systems (GRMS) are also used.
Wednesday, July 30, 2008
Engine Shutdown
Engine shutdown is the automatic or voluntary shutoff of the tractor engine after a certain amount of time. Engine shutdown can be as simple as a corporate “shut down” or “no idle” policy or it can be more complex with the use of electronic devices or software encoded onto the engine control chip that automatically shuts the engine down. Engine shutdown works most effectively when combined with a comprehensive driver training program and driver incentive program. For a partial list of automatic shutdown devices.
Reflashing involves reconfiguring the engine control chip with new software that recalibrates the tractor engine. This recalibration is meant to lower nitrogen oxide (NOx) emissions by slightly modifying the combustion parameters within the engine. This strategy applies to certain engines built by seven different engine manufacturers (Caterpillar, Cummins, Detroit Diesel, Mack, Renault, Navistar/International & Volvo) between the years of 1993 and 1998. Please note that as of March 2004, the California Air Resources Board (CARB) has mandated the reflashing of medium and heavy duty diesel vehicles in the state of California, on a phase-in schedule, at no extra cost to the vehicle owner. For more information, please refer to the CARB rule at
Reflashing involves reconfiguring the engine control chip with new software that recalibrates the tractor engine. This recalibration is meant to lower nitrogen oxide (NOx) emissions by slightly modifying the combustion parameters within the engine. This strategy applies to certain engines built by seven different engine manufacturers (Caterpillar, Cummins, Detroit Diesel, Mack, Renault, Navistar/International & Volvo) between the years of 1993 and 1998. Please note that as of March 2004, the California Air Resources Board (CARB) has mandated the reflashing of medium and heavy duty diesel vehicles in the state of California, on a phase-in schedule, at no extra cost to the vehicle owner. For more information, please refer to the CARB rule at
Tuesday, July 29, 2008
Check windscreen wipers, demisters and washers
- The windscreen wipers are inoperative on any speed;
- Wiper blade rubbers are cracked, hardened, frayed, curled, torn or missing;
- Windscreen washers are inoperative or incorrectly aimed (where applicable);
- Windscreen demister is inoperative or does not blow air onto the windscreen (where applicable);
- The windscreen washer is not able to be operated from a normal driving position.
Monday, July 28, 2008
Check headlights
- Headlight reflector is tarnished or peeling to the extent that headlight performance is impaired;
- Headlight lens is cracked or broken;
- Headlight assembly is not secured or is out of position;
- Headlight does not show while light.
Friday, July 25, 2008
Check number plates
- Any number plate is obscured, for example by a towing attachment, goose neck or tow ball;
- Any number plate cover is tinted, reflective, rounded or bubble like;
- Any number plate is not issued or approved by the State or Territory Road Transport authority, is damaged or faded to the extent that the registration number is not legible from a distance of five metres;
- The number plates are not substantially parallel to the vehicles axles.
Thursday, July 24, 2008
Check wheel/ rim fasteners
- The wheel nut does not fully engage the thread of the wheel stud or the fitting of the wheel nut does not match the taper of the wheel stud hole;
- Any hub has missing, cracked, stripped or broken wheel mounting nuts, studs or bolts;
- Fasteners are not of the correct type for the wheel being used or allow a rim to slip on its spider.
Wednesday, July 23, 2008
Check steering components inside cabin
- Steering wheel is not located in the centre or to the right hand side of the vehicle unless specifically authorised in writing by the State or Territory licensing authority and the vehicle is less than 15 years old;
- The steering wheel is loose on the shaft;
- The steering column is insecure;
- The steering wheel structure is fractured or the hub, rim or spokes are loose
Tuesday, July 22, 2008
Check steering components under the bonnet and under the vehicle
- The pitman arm is loose on the steering output shaft;
- The steering system is not designed to transmit energy by mechanical means only. (Power assisted steering systems are acceptable.);
- The power steering pump has loose mounting bolts or cracked or broken mounting brackets, braces or adaptors, or is inoperative;\
- Power steering pump pulleys are cracked, broken or loose;
- Power steering pump belts are loose, cracked through to reinforcing plies, extensively frayed or missing drive sections;
- Integral power steering assemblies or power assist cylinders leak more than one (1) drop every 30 seconds;
Monday, July 21, 2008
Strong Safety Belt Laws Can Make a Difference
- There are two types of safety belt laws: primary and secondary. A primary safety belt law allows a law enforcement officer to stop a vehicle and issue a citation when the officer simply observes an unbelted driver or passenger. A secondary safety belt law means that a citation for not wearing a safety belt can only be written after the officer stops the vehicle for another infraction.
- safety belt laws are much more effective in increasing safety belt use, because people are more likely to buckle up when there is the perceived risk of receiving a citation for not doing so.19 In 2003, the average safety belt use rate in States with primary enforcement laws was 11 percentage points higher than in States without primary enforcement laws.
- Most teens support primary enforcement safety belt laws. In 2003, a nationwide survey was conducted to determine attitudes regarding primary enforcement safety belt laws. Of those young people 16 to 20 years of age who were surveyed, 64 percent voiced their support for primary enforcement laws.
- One of the strongest predictors of safety belt use among young drivers is a State's safety belt law. From 1998 to 2002, teenage (16-19 years old) driver belt use was significantly lower in crashes occurring in States allowing only secondary enforcement (30 percent) than in crashes occurring in primary law States (49 percent).
Sunday, July 20, 2008
Supervise practice driving
Take an active role in helping your teenager learn how to drive. Plan a series of practice sessions in a wide variety of situations, including night driving. Give beginners time to work up to challenges like driving in heavy traffic or on the freeway. Supervised practice should be spread over at least six months and continue even after a teenager graduates from a learner’s permit to a restricted or full license. Remember that you’re a role model. New drivers learn a lot by example, so practice safe driving. Teens with crashes and violations often have parents with poor driving records.
Thursday, July 17, 2008
Visually inspect ullage and safety valves
- where a container is fitted with an automatic fill limiter (AFL), there is no label at the filling point warning the driver "AFL fitted - bleeding during filling not required";
- where an ullage valve is fitted, the outlet does not have a cap or plug;
- NOTE: An ullage valve is not required if the vehicle is fitted with an AFL. where a container is not fitted with an AFL, there is no label warning the driver to "Stop filling when liquid appears";
- the safety valve has any damage in the system or blockage to the discharge pipe, if fitted, or allows the discharge to strike the exhaust system, container or a bystander, or the protective cap is not functioning or is missing.
Wednesday, July 16, 2008
Visually inspect Fire Extinguisher (where required)
- Fire extinguisher is not filled or charged;
- Handles, nozzles or hoses of fire extinguisher is missing or damaged;
- The extinguisher is not securely mounted in the vehicle.
Note: Fire extinguishers can become ineffective even though they appear properly charged. For example powder type extinguishers subject to vibration can fail due to compacting of the powder.
Australian Standards AS 1851.1-1995 Portable Fire Extinguishers, contains suitable procedures for inspecting and testing fire extinguishers.
Tuesday, July 15, 2008
Brake testing with a skid-plate tester
NOTE: This section should be read in conjunction with the equipment manufacturer’s instructions.
Using a skid-plate tester, check the deceleration rates and retardation forces on each axle in accordance with the manufacturer’s test procedure.
Reasons for rejection
Using a skid-plate tester, check the deceleration rates and retardation forces on each axle in accordance with the manufacturer’s test procedure.
Reasons for rejection
- There is more than 30% difference in the brake force between the wheels on any same axle;
- The service braking system decelerates the vehicle at less than the performance ;
- In other than ADR 35 vehicles, or vehicles fitted with a tandem master cylinder/dual circuit brakes, the emergency brake decelerates the vehicle at less than the performance ;
- Where ADR 35 applies, or vehicles fitted with a tandem master cylinder/dual circuit brakes, the parking brake does not provide any retardation.
Brake testing with a skid-plate tester
NOTE: This section should be read in conjunction with the equipment manufacturer’s instructions.
Using a skid-plate tester, check the deceleration rates and retardation forces on each axle in accordance with the manufacturer’s test procedure.
Reasons for rejection
Using a skid-plate tester, check the deceleration rates and retardation forces on each axle in accordance with the manufacturer’s test procedure.
Reasons for rejection
- There is more than 30% difference in the brake force between the wheels on any same axle;
- The service braking system decelerates the vehicle at less than the performance ;
- In other than ADR 35 vehicles, or vehicles fitted with a tandem master cylinder/dual circuit brakes, the emergency brake decelerates the vehicle at less than the performance ;
- Where ADR 35 applies, or vehicles fitted with a tandem master cylinder/dual circuit brakes, the parking brake does not provide any retardation.
Check braking system operation
- Any brake failure indicators do not operate;
- Any compulsory pressure, vacuum or low level warning devices or gauges do not operate;
- The brake controls do not cause the corresponding brake to apply when they are operated (with the engine running if necessary).
Thursday, July 10, 2008
Check exhaust system
Reasons for rejection
1. Any component of the exhaust system is not securely mounted;
2. The exhaust system contacts any unrelated part of the vehicle;
3. Exhaust pipe outlet is not rearward of all rear passenger doors or sleeper compartment;
4. There is any leak in the exhaust system (excluding manufacturers’ drain holes in the mufflers);
5. A catalytic converter is missing, bypassed or has a missing heat shield.
NOTE: Some vehicles are not built with catalytic converters or heat shield
1. Any component of the exhaust system is not securely mounted;
2. The exhaust system contacts any unrelated part of the vehicle;
3. Exhaust pipe outlet is not rearward of all rear passenger doors or sleeper compartment;
4. There is any leak in the exhaust system (excluding manufacturers’ drain holes in the mufflers);
5. A catalytic converter is missing, bypassed or has a missing heat shield.
NOTE: Some vehicles are not built with catalytic converters or heat shield
Wednesday, July 9, 2008
Check headlight aim using a headlight tester
- (Includes driving lights and alternative headlights)
NOTE: This section should be read in conjunction with the equipment manufacturer’s instructions.
Reasons for rejection
- the aim of the headlight is adjusted such that, when on high beam and measured at an effective distance of 8m, the projected centre of the beam is to the right of the headlight centre and/or is above the headlight centre;
- measured at an effective distance of 8m, any part of the top edge of the high intensity portion of the low beam pattern is above and to the right of the centreline of the headlight;
NOTES:
- in the region above and to the right of the centreline of the headlight the luminous intensity must not exceed 437cd.
- the portion of the beam to the left of the centreline of the light may extend above the height of the centreline of the headlight.
- the "centreline of the headlight" passes through the centre of the globe filament, or equivalent
- the headlight high beam indicator light is not operating
Tuesday, July 8, 2008
Check electrical equipment
Reasons for rejection
- Electrical wiring or connectors are corroded, damaged, bare live wires (except earth wire) or hanging loose in a way that could allow it to be damaged;
- Electrical wiring is located where it can:
- become exposed to excessive heat;
- come into contact with moving parts;
- come near a fuel system to cause a fire hazard.
1. Batteries are not securely mounted, leak or are situated in an occupant space.
Check tyres
Reasons for rejection
- A tyre does not have at least 1.5 mm tread depth in a continuous band which runs around the whole circumference of the tyre and extends across at least 75% of the width of the tyre;
NOTES:
- Tread wear indicators are built into most tyres to indicate when tread depth reaches about 1.5mm. The depth of the tyre tread above these indicators is not included in the assessment of tread depth around the circumference of a tyre.
- In effect, these requirements allow a tyre to be worn to less than 1.5mm tread depth on its edges, provided that at least 75% of the remaining width of the tyre has a minimum tread depth of 1.5mm around the whole circumference.
- The overall diameter of dual tyres on the same side of an axle is not matched within 25 mm;
- A tyre (including sidewalls) has deep cuts, chunking, bumps, bulges, exposed cords or other signs of carcass failure;
- A tyre has been regrooved (except where indicated on the side wall that the tyres are suitable for regrooving);
- When in the straight ahead position, the wheels and tyres and fittings (wheel nuts, grease caps etc) of any vehicle project beyond the extreme width of the mudguards or exceed the maximum width of a vehicle;
- Any tyre is not of a type constructed for unrestricted road use;
- Any retreaded or remoulded tyre is not marked with the words "RETREAD" or "REMOULD", and where speed limited the words "MAX. SPEED XX KM/H" or "SPEED LIMITED TO XX KM/H". (XX means the max speed i.e. 125km/h);
- A tyre fitted to a vehicle with a GVM of more than 4.5 tonnes is not suitable for road use at:
Monday, July 7, 2008
Check steering components inside cabin
- Steering wheel is not located in the centre or to the right hand side of the vehicle unless specifically authorised in writing by the State or Territory licensing authority and the vehicle is less than 15 years old;
- The steering wheel is loose on the shaft;
- The steering column is insecure;
- The steering wheel structure is fractured or the hub, rim or spokes are loose.
Thursday, July 3, 2008
Safety Belt Enforcement Programs
- Occupant Protection Selective Traffic Enforcement Programs (sTEPs) involve periods of highly visible safety belt law enforcement combined with extensive media support. These programs are a proven method to rapidly change motorists' safety belt use behavior. Successful Occupant Protection sTEPs have been documented in Canada, Europe, and the United States.
- visible enforcement of safety belt laws is a core strategy to increase safety belt use. States and communities have greater success in achieving increased safety belt use when there is strong enforcement of the law, along with effective media support.27 This strong enforcement of safety belt laws sends the message that the State takes safety belt use laws seriously. Ultimately, this leads to greater compliance.
- The Click It or Ticket (CIOT) model has been enormously successful in increasing safety belt use at the community, State, and regional level. This nationwide initiative, a partnership involving NHTSA, the Air Bag & Seat Belt Safety Campaign, and hundreds of law enforcement agencies, increased national belt use by four percentage points in 2003.28 Safety belt use increased again in 2004, reaching an all-time high of 80 percent.
- Many jurisdictions in the United States have adopted Graduated Driver Licensing (GDL), a system designed to delay full licensure while allowing beginners to obtain their initial experience under lower-risk conditions. There are three stages: a minimum supervised learner's period, an intermediate license, and a full-privilege driver's license after successful completion of the first two stages. A strong GDL system will include education and enforcement of safety belt laws. For example, in North Carolina, the GDL law includes a provision for violations of GDL restrictions that includes safety belt infractions; a conviction extends the interim licensing period for six months from the time of the violation.
Wednesday, July 2, 2008
Diesel Oxidation Catalyst (DOC)
A diesel oxidation catalyst (DOC) is a device added to the exhaust system of a tractor that reduces the amount of particulate matter (PM) emitted. The device is generally a large honeycomb structure with an active catalyst made up of a layer of precious metal. Emission reductions are approximately 20% for PM, 40% for hydrocarbons and 50% for carbon monoxide. DOC’s have a negligible impact on tractor fuel efficiency. Costs are dependent upon the size of the engine and are usually between $1000 and $2000 per unit, making them an ideal retrofit device.
Tuesday, July 1, 2008
Thermal Imaging Inspection System
FMCSA has launched a project to demonstrate a thermal imaging inspection system (TIIS) that leverages state-of-the-art thermal imagery technology, integrated with signature recognition software, in order to provide the capability to identify in real-time faults and impending failures in tires, brakes, and bearings mounted on large trucks and motor coaches. A two-year research grant was awarded to International Electronic Machines Corporation for $1.4 million to conduct the TIIS project, as directed by Congress under Section 5513(a) of the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, and Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU) Act of 2005.
The project will be conducted in a field environment along the interstate highway to further assess the system ability to identify commercial motor vehicle (CMV) component faults and failures. A predictive tool that identifies impending tire, brake, or bearing failures and provides a timeframe in which these failures may occur will be developed and integrated into the TIIS. This project will also assess technological enhancements in the capabilities of thermal imaging systems, as related to the Agency prior research of infrared technology conducted six years ago.
The project will be conducted in a field environment along the interstate highway to further assess the system ability to identify commercial motor vehicle (CMV) component faults and failures. A predictive tool that identifies impending tire, brake, or bearing failures and provides a timeframe in which these failures may occur will be developed and integrated into the TIIS. This project will also assess technological enhancements in the capabilities of thermal imaging systems, as related to the Agency prior research of infrared technology conducted six years ago.
Sunday, June 29, 2008
When You Pay Road Tax
- Road tax shall be payable in advance in respect of every motor vehicle on or before the fifteenth of April each year. The owner of a motor vehicle shall have the option of paying the tax in four quarterly installments payable on or before the fifteenth of April, July, October and January.
- a person fails to pay an installment of tax within fifteenth of April, July, October and January each year, he shall be liable to pay in addition to arrears of taxes, penalty as prescribed.
- In case of default of payment of road taxes, the arrears of taxes will be recoverable as arrears to Land revenue.
Wednesday, June 25, 2008
Data Extraction
If the selection of crashes for upload to SAFETYNET is done by computer extraction, it is critical that all the necessary elements are present to accurately make the extraction. For crashes involving non-fatal injuries, or vehicle damage, additional data are very important. The selection criteria related to crash severity requires identification that a person was BOTH injured and transported for treatment or that a vehicle was BOTH towed and received disabling damage
Monday, June 23, 2008
Potential Crash Report Problems
Limited space on a form can result in the use of space saving measures such as a “merging” of data elements into a single field. This can result in fields that don’t appropriately record the intended data. One example would be the use of the same field for the officer to record the registered vehicle owner and the responsible carrier. The owner of the vehicle is NOT always the motor carrier. If the officer records the name of the owner and the USDOT of the proper motor carrier, this will produce a mis-match when the case is uploaded in SAFETYNET. Conversely, recording the motor carrier can cause the registered vehicle owner to be lost. Another example would be a lack of sufficient space for the officer to write the entire motor carrier name or address. This promotes abbreviations and partial names to be recorded, making it difficult to resolve any errors.
Sunday, June 22, 2008
Carrier Identification
The information on interstate or intrastate carriers is provided to the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration which uses the data to target unsafe carriers for more in-depth investigations. A poor safety record can lead to a carrier losing its operating authority. Missing or inaccurate carrier information when reporting on a qualifying crash can allow “unsafe” carriers to escape regulation or cause “safe” carriers to inappropriately have their safety records affected. Consequently, when reporting crashes it is critical to report the correct carrier name, number and address.
NOTE: The companies and carriers shown in the photographs on this site are included for illustrative purposes only. These images in NO WAY indicate or imply unsafe or improper operating practices by those pictured.
NOTE: The companies and carriers shown in the photographs on this site are included for illustrative purposes only. These images in NO WAY indicate or imply unsafe or improper operating practices by those pictured.
Saturday, June 21, 2008
Onboard Monitoring to Improve Commercial Motor Vehicle Safety
The overall objective of this program is to determine whether onboard monitoring and feedback can improve C commercial motor vehicle driver performance and safety. This project will (1) define which driver performance aspects should be measured, (2) determine the best means of communicating information to the driver (e.g., real-time or delayed feedback), (3) design and development of a prototype suite, and (4) develop a research methodology for the follow-on FOT.
Thursday, June 19, 2008
Enhanced Rear Signaling for Commercial Motor Vehicles
In September, 2005 FMCSA initiated development of a prototype enhanced rear signaling system for use on commercial motor vehicles (CMVs). The system incorporates countermeasures that were developed in Phase I of this project. The system was evaluated by installing it on a test truck and by observing the behavior of drivers in real-world conditions. Based on the analysis of following driver behavior, the system showed that there are possible benefits to this system, or elements of this system, when used on CMVs. FMCSA is now considering conducting a field operational test (FOT) to further explore this system.
The countermeasures identified in Phase I include: (1) LED brake lamps with an ambient light sensor to make the lamps brighter in direct sunlight and more conspicuous in bright ambient light, (2) brake lamps that are activated by engine braking to address the increasing use of jake brakes in CMVs, (3) additional conspicuity markings that create a more accurate perception of the truck position for following drivers, (4) a sensor system that detects and tracks a following vehicle and sounds a focused audio signal and illuminates a traffic clearing lamp when the vehicle is following too closely or approaching at too high a rate of speed.
Phase III of the Enhanced Rear Signaling project will entail lab, simulator, track, and jury tests to ascertain the best configuration and combination of countermeasures to be used in a large scale FOT. In addition, a large scale, 18-month FOT will be designed. The research will entail exploration of most effective photometric characteristics of the enhanced brake lamps, comparison of existing required retro-reflective markings with the octagonal retro-reflective markings developed in Phase I, and lab/simulator and/or track tests of changes in closure rates with the prototype and without.
Phase IV of the Enhanced Rear Signaling project will execute a large-scale field operational test to analyze the benefits of the prototype system developed in Phase II. Its goal will be to determine the effectiveness of the specific components of the system and develop support for any potential rulemaking action that NHTSA may choose to undertake.
The countermeasures identified in Phase I include: (1) LED brake lamps with an ambient light sensor to make the lamps brighter in direct sunlight and more conspicuous in bright ambient light, (2) brake lamps that are activated by engine braking to address the increasing use of jake brakes in CMVs, (3) additional conspicuity markings that create a more accurate perception of the truck position for following drivers, (4) a sensor system that detects and tracks a following vehicle and sounds a focused audio signal and illuminates a traffic clearing lamp when the vehicle is following too closely or approaching at too high a rate of speed.
Phase III of the Enhanced Rear Signaling project will entail lab, simulator, track, and jury tests to ascertain the best configuration and combination of countermeasures to be used in a large scale FOT. In addition, a large scale, 18-month FOT will be designed. The research will entail exploration of most effective photometric characteristics of the enhanced brake lamps, comparison of existing required retro-reflective markings with the octagonal retro-reflective markings developed in Phase I, and lab/simulator and/or track tests of changes in closure rates with the prototype and without.
Phase IV of the Enhanced Rear Signaling project will execute a large-scale field operational test to analyze the benefits of the prototype system developed in Phase II. Its goal will be to determine the effectiveness of the specific components of the system and develop support for any potential rulemaking action that NHTSA may choose to undertake.
Wednesday, June 18, 2008
Advanced Driver Fatigue Research – GWU earmark
This report summarizes the findings of the Advanced Driver Fatigue Research project conducted by the Center for Intelligent Systems Research (CISR) of the George Washington University, and funded by FMCSA. This goal of this project was to develop an unobtrusive drowsy driver detection system for commercial motor carriers. CISR previously developed an effective drowsiness detection system for automobiles that relied solely on the driver’s steering patterns for input. This project’s evaluation of this system confirms that this approach is equally valid for truck drivers, despite the differences between truck and automobile driving. The drowsy driver detection system exhibited acceptable false positive and false negative readings and an ideal warning rate before crashes.
Monday, June 16, 2008
Thermal Imaging Inspection System
FMCSA has launched a project to demonstrate a thermal imaging inspection system (TIIS) that leverages state-of-the-art thermal imagery technology, integrated with signature recognition software, in order to provide the capability to identify in real-time faults and impending failures in tires, brakes, and bearings mounted on large trucks and motor coaches. A two-year research grant was awarded to International Electronic Machines Corporation for $1.4 million to conduct the TIIS project, as directed by Congress under Section 5513 of the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, and Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU) Act of 2005.
The project will be conducted in a field environment along the interstate highway to further assess the system ability to identify commercial motor vehicle (CMV) component faults and failures. A predictive tool that identifies impending tire, brake, or bearing failures and provides a timeframe in which these failures may occur will be developed and integrated into the TIIS. This project will also assess technological enhancements in the capabilities of thermal imaging systems, as related to the Agency prior research of infrared technology conducted six years ago.
The project will be conducted in a field environment along the interstate highway to further assess the system ability to identify commercial motor vehicle (CMV) component faults and failures. A predictive tool that identifies impending tire, brake, or bearing failures and provides a timeframe in which these failures may occur will be developed and integrated into the TIIS. This project will also assess technological enhancements in the capabilities of thermal imaging systems, as related to the Agency prior research of infrared technology conducted six years ago.
Roads
The total length of roads in KwaZulu-Natal is 25,600 km. This includes 1,147 km of the road network in the eThekwini Metro area and 1,138 km of national routes. 6,656 km are surfaced and 18,943 km are gravel.
The main national routes are the N3 (Durban to Gauteng), N2 South (Durban to Kokstad) and the N2 North (Durban to Pongola). The N3 to Gauteng is the busiest road freight corridor in South Africa, carrying a volume of over 1.5 million vehicles per year on the Durban to Pietermaritzburg section. The authorities charged with the maintenance of provincial roads face the continual challenge of maintaining the condition of roads with limited funds, in spite of increasing usage.
The combined effect of national policies of deregulation of road transport, commercialisation of rail, increased legal axle-mass loads and gross combination mass of heavy vehicles has resulted in a continual shift of cargo from rail to road transport. This results in an increase in road damage, accidents, congestion and gas emissions.
The situation is aggravated by endemic overloading of heavy vehicles which, though better controlled in KZN than the rest of the country, has negative consequences for the life of the roads in the province.
The cumulative effects of increasing road usage and accumulated deficits in the funding of road maintenance are felt by all road users in terms of increased vehicle operating costs. The deteriorating condition of roads in KwaZulu-Natal is a cause for grave concern as it contributes to rising costs, inflation and increasing accident rates. It is noteworthy that the Department has in recent years, placed considerable emphasis on the development of roads in remote rural areas and is in the process of upgrading several major provincial roads such as the P700 route to Ulundi and the P496 John Ross Highway from Empangeni to Richards Bay .
It will in the near future be critically necessary to reassess the provision of road infrastructure between the N3 corridor and the Port of Durban as increasing congestion and delays are having a negative impact on the efficiency of the logistics system surrounding the port.
The main national routes are the N3 (Durban to Gauteng), N2 South (Durban to Kokstad) and the N2 North (Durban to Pongola). The N3 to Gauteng is the busiest road freight corridor in South Africa, carrying a volume of over 1.5 million vehicles per year on the Durban to Pietermaritzburg section. The authorities charged with the maintenance of provincial roads face the continual challenge of maintaining the condition of roads with limited funds, in spite of increasing usage.
The combined effect of national policies of deregulation of road transport, commercialisation of rail, increased legal axle-mass loads and gross combination mass of heavy vehicles has resulted in a continual shift of cargo from rail to road transport. This results in an increase in road damage, accidents, congestion and gas emissions.
The situation is aggravated by endemic overloading of heavy vehicles which, though better controlled in KZN than the rest of the country, has negative consequences for the life of the roads in the province.
The cumulative effects of increasing road usage and accumulated deficits in the funding of road maintenance are felt by all road users in terms of increased vehicle operating costs. The deteriorating condition of roads in KwaZulu-Natal is a cause for grave concern as it contributes to rising costs, inflation and increasing accident rates. It is noteworthy that the Department has in recent years, placed considerable emphasis on the development of roads in remote rural areas and is in the process of upgrading several major provincial roads such as the P700 route to Ulundi and the P496 John Ross Highway from Empangeni to Richards Bay .
It will in the near future be critically necessary to reassess the provision of road infrastructure between the N3 corridor and the Port of Durban as increasing congestion and delays are having a negative impact on the efficiency of the logistics system surrounding the port.
Friday, June 13, 2008
Diesel Particulate Filter (DPF)
A diesel particulate filter (DPF) is similar to a diesel oxidation catalyst and is one of the two major technologies being employed to meet the 2007 emissions regulations. A DPF is considered a “flow-through’ device whereby the exhaust is forced through a honeycomb shaped, ceramic filter that is blocked at one end. Because of this design, it is important to monitor the exhaust back pressure and ensure the DPF is cleaned properly so that the filter does not become blocked. Most filters are designed to clean themselves (referred to as passive regeneration) but this requires an elevated engine temperature to burn off the trapped PM. For vehicles that don’t meet the minimum temperature requirements, the filter will trigger what’s referred to as an ‘active regeneration event’. This means that some diesel fuel will be allowed to pass through the engine un-combusted and will be burnt over the catalyst, allowing the PM within the filter to be burned away. One major difference between the DOC and DPF is that the DPF requires the use of ultra low sulfur diesel (ULSD) fuel with sulfur content at or below 15 parts per million. Emission reductions are approximately 50 - 90% for PM, 90% for hydrocarbons and 90% for carbon monoxide.
ALCOHOL MISUSE
The primary objective of the controlled substances use and alcohol misuse program is deterrence rather than detection. Public safety is best served if drivers are aware of the effects of alcohol and controlled substances on health, safety, and the work environment.
Consequently, the FMCSA believes that educating drivers and training supervisors are
essential for these programs to be effective. Employers are required to provide educational materials for drivers (see Chapter 3) and training for supervisors prior to the start of testing (§382.601 and §382.603, respectively).
Furthermore, the FMCSA regulations and associated DOT regulations (49 CFR part 40) specify the involvement of professional and technical personnel in the administration of your alcohol and controlled substances program. These personnel include the medical review officer (MRO), the substance abuse professional (SAP), the screening test
Consequently, the FMCSA believes that educating drivers and training supervisors are
essential for these programs to be effective. Employers are required to provide educational materials for drivers (see Chapter 3) and training for supervisors prior to the start of testing (§382.601 and §382.603, respectively).
Furthermore, the FMCSA regulations and associated DOT regulations (49 CFR part 40) specify the involvement of professional and technical personnel in the administration of your alcohol and controlled substances program. These personnel include the medical review officer (MRO), the substance abuse professional (SAP), the screening test
Wednesday, June 11, 2008
More stations benefit from funding to improve access
Accessibility is to improve at 45 more stations in England and Wales, Rail Minister Tom Harris announced today. The stations have been included in the second round of the Department for Transport's Access for All funding.
Access for All is a ring-fenced fund of over £370 million through to 2015. The investment will make stations easier for disabled people to use. It means that passengers will get an obstacle free, accessible route from station entrances, to and between all platforms. The funding is provided over and above commitments made in franchises, the ongoing renewal of stations and major station improvement projects.
Today's announcement brings the number of stations to be improved to 92, with a third round of stations expected to be announced next year. Work will be carried out by Network Rail and completed between 2009 - 2011.
In addition, the Government has allocated an additional £2.5m in the second round of Small Schemes funding. This will deliver enhancements such as ramps, induction loops, improved flooring and disabled parking at over 300 stations. The funding, part of the Access for All fund announced in March, will be matched by funding from elsewhere in the industry, bringing the total level of investment to almost £12m.
Rail Minister Tom Harris said:
"We want to encourage more passengers to use the rail network, and part of that is ensuring that stations are accessible. Lifts, step-free access, more disabled parking and better signage make a significant difference to many.
"These improvements will deliver real benefits for disabled passengers."
Access for All is a ring-fenced fund of over £370 million through to 2015. The investment will make stations easier for disabled people to use. It means that passengers will get an obstacle free, accessible route from station entrances, to and between all platforms. The funding is provided over and above commitments made in franchises, the ongoing renewal of stations and major station improvement projects.
Today's announcement brings the number of stations to be improved to 92, with a third round of stations expected to be announced next year. Work will be carried out by Network Rail and completed between 2009 - 2011.
In addition, the Government has allocated an additional £2.5m in the second round of Small Schemes funding. This will deliver enhancements such as ramps, induction loops, improved flooring and disabled parking at over 300 stations. The funding, part of the Access for All fund announced in March, will be matched by funding from elsewhere in the industry, bringing the total level of investment to almost £12m.
Rail Minister Tom Harris said:
"We want to encourage more passengers to use the rail network, and part of that is ensuring that stations are accessible. Lifts, step-free access, more disabled parking and better signage make a significant difference to many.
"These improvements will deliver real benefits for disabled passengers."
Boost for road safety drive; Road Safety Bill granted Royal Assent
The Government's ongoing drive to improve safety on our roads took a significant step forward today after the Road Safety Bill was granted Royal Assent.
The Road Safety Act will introduce the new offences of causing death by careless driving or causing death by driving while unlicensed, disqualified or uninsured. It will crack down on motorists who break the law by driving without insurance, or using a vehicle that is unroadworthy, and will also make it more difficult for foreign drivers to escape penalties for driving offences committed in the UK.
It will also bring in measures to raise driving standards through better education and training, and offer more appropriate penalties for offences such as speeding or driving using a hand-held mobile phone.
Transport Minister Stephen Ladyman said:
"We have one of the best safety records in the world. Over 15,000 fewer people were killed or seriously injured in road accidents in 2005 than compared to the mid-1990s. But nine people still die needlessly every day, causing terrible trauma for their families and friends. That is why we are determined to stamp out bad and irresponsible driving, which endangers us all.
"The new Road Safety Act plugs gaps in current legislation to stop drivers who kill walking away from court with just a fine. It clamps down on those who keep untaxed, uninsured or unroadworthy vehicles. It provides greater powers as we work to eradicate the scourge of drink driving and puts in place measures to improve the training and testing of our young drivers."
Home Office Minister Gerry Sutcliffe added:
"We believe the new offences of causing death by careless driving and causing death while driving unlicensed, disqualified or uninsured strike the right balance between the level of criminal fault on the part of the bad driver and the devastation their actions can cause. We've responded to the concerns of families, victims, road safety groups and the police. That's why we've created a tougher legal framework to deal with bad driving. "
Research shows that one moment of carelessness on the road can have serious consequences. 32% of car occupants die in single vehicle accidents, which involve no other vehicle, and statistics show that these types of accidents are increasing. It is for this reason the Road Safety Act is being introduced.
Its main actions are:
1. Introducing a new offence of causing death by careless or inconsiderate driving and of causing death by driving while unlicensed, disqualified or uninsured. These offences will carry a carry a custodial sentence of up to 5 years and 2 years respectively and are likely to come into law next year. The Act will also increase the penalty fines for careless and inconsiderate driving, doubling the fine from £2500 to £5000;
2. Introducing the new offence of being the registered keeper of an uninsured vehicle. This will carry a fixed penalty fine of £100 plus the power for the enforcement authorities to clamp and, in appropriate cases, dispose of such vehicles. Technology already in place - automatic number plate recognition cameras - linked to databases of uninsured vehicles already helps police to instantly spot and ultimately seize and destroy cars being driven without insurance. Consultation on the detailed regulations for this scheme will be launched early next year;
3. The penalties for the existing offences of using a hand-held mobile phone while driving and for failing to have proper control of a vehicle will be increased to include three penalty points and a £60 fixed penalty fine;
4. The range of penalty points for speeding is to be extended and retraining for speeders will be available under the new Act. This will allow tougher punishment for those who speed the most seriously, as well as scope for lesser penalties for less severe speeding. Consultation on the detail of how this will work will be launched soon;
5. The Act will give the Government powers to make repeat drink-drive offenders retake their driving test. It will ensure that repeat offenders are kept from driving until they have completed the necessary medical examination. It also enables the future use of alcohol ignition interlocks - which have been shown to be very effective in discouraging persistent re-offending.
6. To prevent foreign drivers evading penalties for breaking our laws of the Road, the Act will enable police and VOSA enforcement officers to require offenders who cannot supply a satisfactory UK address to pay an immediate deposit in lieu of a fixed penalty, or pending a court hearing. If they fail to pay the deposit officers are to be given powers to immobilise the vehicle, preventing drivers from leaving the country before payment of a fixed penalty.
7. To improve the training and testing available to young or new drivers, the Act will facilitate the introduction of new arrangements for professional driving instructors, thereby helping to further improve their standards. It will also provide for the introduction of mandatory quality assurance arrangements in those areas of driver training that are not currently regulated, and where there is a clear need for intervention to raise standards. Alongside this, it provides for the publishing of information about persons and organisations providing driver training.
The Road Safety Act will introduce the new offences of causing death by careless driving or causing death by driving while unlicensed, disqualified or uninsured. It will crack down on motorists who break the law by driving without insurance, or using a vehicle that is unroadworthy, and will also make it more difficult for foreign drivers to escape penalties for driving offences committed in the UK.
It will also bring in measures to raise driving standards through better education and training, and offer more appropriate penalties for offences such as speeding or driving using a hand-held mobile phone.
Transport Minister Stephen Ladyman said:
"We have one of the best safety records in the world. Over 15,000 fewer people were killed or seriously injured in road accidents in 2005 than compared to the mid-1990s. But nine people still die needlessly every day, causing terrible trauma for their families and friends. That is why we are determined to stamp out bad and irresponsible driving, which endangers us all.
"The new Road Safety Act plugs gaps in current legislation to stop drivers who kill walking away from court with just a fine. It clamps down on those who keep untaxed, uninsured or unroadworthy vehicles. It provides greater powers as we work to eradicate the scourge of drink driving and puts in place measures to improve the training and testing of our young drivers."
Home Office Minister Gerry Sutcliffe added:
"We believe the new offences of causing death by careless driving and causing death while driving unlicensed, disqualified or uninsured strike the right balance between the level of criminal fault on the part of the bad driver and the devastation their actions can cause. We've responded to the concerns of families, victims, road safety groups and the police. That's why we've created a tougher legal framework to deal with bad driving. "
Research shows that one moment of carelessness on the road can have serious consequences. 32% of car occupants die in single vehicle accidents, which involve no other vehicle, and statistics show that these types of accidents are increasing. It is for this reason the Road Safety Act is being introduced.
Its main actions are:
1. Introducing a new offence of causing death by careless or inconsiderate driving and of causing death by driving while unlicensed, disqualified or uninsured. These offences will carry a carry a custodial sentence of up to 5 years and 2 years respectively and are likely to come into law next year. The Act will also increase the penalty fines for careless and inconsiderate driving, doubling the fine from £2500 to £5000;
2. Introducing the new offence of being the registered keeper of an uninsured vehicle. This will carry a fixed penalty fine of £100 plus the power for the enforcement authorities to clamp and, in appropriate cases, dispose of such vehicles. Technology already in place - automatic number plate recognition cameras - linked to databases of uninsured vehicles already helps police to instantly spot and ultimately seize and destroy cars being driven without insurance. Consultation on the detailed regulations for this scheme will be launched early next year;
3. The penalties for the existing offences of using a hand-held mobile phone while driving and for failing to have proper control of a vehicle will be increased to include three penalty points and a £60 fixed penalty fine;
4. The range of penalty points for speeding is to be extended and retraining for speeders will be available under the new Act. This will allow tougher punishment for those who speed the most seriously, as well as scope for lesser penalties for less severe speeding. Consultation on the detail of how this will work will be launched soon;
5. The Act will give the Government powers to make repeat drink-drive offenders retake their driving test. It will ensure that repeat offenders are kept from driving until they have completed the necessary medical examination. It also enables the future use of alcohol ignition interlocks - which have been shown to be very effective in discouraging persistent re-offending.
6. To prevent foreign drivers evading penalties for breaking our laws of the Road, the Act will enable police and VOSA enforcement officers to require offenders who cannot supply a satisfactory UK address to pay an immediate deposit in lieu of a fixed penalty, or pending a court hearing. If they fail to pay the deposit officers are to be given powers to immobilise the vehicle, preventing drivers from leaving the country before payment of a fixed penalty.
7. To improve the training and testing available to young or new drivers, the Act will facilitate the introduction of new arrangements for professional driving instructors, thereby helping to further improve their standards. It will also provide for the introduction of mandatory quality assurance arrangements in those areas of driver training that are not currently regulated, and where there is a clear need for intervention to raise standards. Alongside this, it provides for the publishing of information about persons and organisations providing driver training.
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